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THE LONG ROAD BACK TO SKOKIE:
RETURNING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TOMASK
WEARERS
Rob Kahn*
Professor of Law
St. Thomas University
When the Seventh Circuit upheld the First Amendment right of Nazis
to march in Skokie, Illinois in 1978, the protection of mask wearers
was not far behind. Since then, doctrinal paths have diverged. While
the Supreme Court continues to protect hate speech, mask wearing
has been increasingly placed outside First Amendment protection.
This Article seeks to get to the bottom of this doctrinal divergence
by addressing the symbolic purposes of mask bans—rooted in
repudiating the Ku Klux Klan—as well as the doctrinal steps taken
over the past forty years to restrict the First Amendment claims of
mask wearers. It also highlights the dangers posed by the current,
state-friendly mask law doctrine in an age of technological growth,
mass surveillance, and a move to anoint Antifa as the new Ku Klux
Klan. The Article ends with a call for courts to restore mask wearing
to its rightful place in the First Amendment pantheon.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THEDECLINE OFMASKBANDOCTRINE
A. A Puzzle and a Problem
Today, the First Amendment protection of masks is in decline.
1
As late as the 1970s and 1980s—the very time the Seventh Circuit
* B.A. Columbia College, Columbia University, J.D. New York University, PhD
Johns Hopkins University (Political Science), Professor of Law, St. Thomas
University, Minneapolis, Minnesota. This Article grew out of a March 2019
presentation at St. Thomas University on Alabama’s mask ban and a May 2019
presentation on the symbolic messages mask laws convey about the state at the
Third Annual Conference on Memory Laws in European and Comparative
Perspective in Brussels, Belgium. I would like to thank Jacqueline Baronian, Tom
Berg, Mike Paulsen, Greg Sisk, Rachel Moran, Jerry Organ, Mitchel Gordon,
Julie Oseid, Niki Catlin, Megan McNevin, George Soroka, Félix Krawatzek,
Graźyna Baranowska, Nikolay Koposov, Maria Mälksoo, Uladzislau Belavusau,
and Eric Heinze for their questions and comments. I also want to thank the staff
of the Brooklyn Journal of Law and Policy for their careful editing of this Article.
1
See Margot E. Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying
Anti-Mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA&ENT. L.J. 815, 854–74 (2013) (citing to precedent upholding anti-mask
state laws more recent than cases finding “anti-mask laws unconstitutional under
the First Amendment”); James Pasley, 12 US States and 7 Countries That Have
Barred Protesters from Wearing Masks, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/countries-states-where-protesters-cant-wear-
masks-2019-10 (noting how California, the District of Columbia, Ohio, Florida,
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was defending the right of Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois
2
—the
First Amendment also appeared to protect mask wearers.
3
Over the
next forty years, this changed.
4
As the United States Supreme Court
vigorously protected a wide variety of offensive speech,
5
mask ban
doctrine drifted toward greater restrictions.
6
Finally, the Second
Circuit ruling in Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v. Kerik
7
slammed the door on mask law claims which, the
Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, North Dakota, Virginia and
West Virginia have enacted some variation of an anti-mask law).
2
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206–07 (7th Cir. 1978). The debate
over whether Nazis had the right to hold a peaceful demonstration in a community
with a high percentage of Holocaust survivors split the ACLU but stood as a
monument to the idea that in the United States, the First Amendment protects
offensive speech—even hate speech. For an overview of the Skokie Affair, see
DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1985). See also LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT
SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 38 (1986)
(noting the degree to which “the United States . . . tolerate[s] racist rhetoric”);
SAMUELWALKER, HATE SPEECH: THEHISTORY OF ANAMERICANCONTROVERSY
120 (1994) (describing the Skokie Affair as showing the “national commitment
to protecting hate speech”).
3
Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (upholding the
right of Iranian students to wear masks to protest the Shah); Ghafari v. Mun. Court
for S.F. Judicial Dist., 150 Cal. Rptr. 813, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (invalidating
mask ban on overbreadth grounds); Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1077
(Fla. 1980) (same).
4
See, e.g., Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356
F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004); State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990); State v.
Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1996).
5
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (noting that the
First Amendment protects lying about one’s military record); Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443 (2011) (noting that free speech includes carrying signs with
homophobic messages outside a military funeral); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (noting that the First Amendment protects flag burning); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (developing the incitement test in the context of a Klan
rally). Themajor exception,Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), involves cross
burning, which, significantly, shares a Klan context with mask bans.
6
See, e.g., Kerik, 356 F.3d 197; Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547; Berrill, 474 S.E.2d
508.
7
Kerik, 356 F.3d 197.
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court held, do not normally implicate symbolic speech or freedom
of association concerns meriting First Amendment treatment.
8
These doctrinal changes are important because today’s mask
bans are no longer simply about the Klan.
9
In April 2018, when neo-
Nazis and anti-racist protesters faced off in a small Georgia town,
Georgia police used the state’s mask law to arrest the anti-racist
protesters.
10
Later the same year, officers arrested Carlos Chaverst
Jr. under Alabama’s mask ban after his leading a protest against the
officer-involved shooting of an African American at a metro-
Birmingham shopping mall.
11
Meanwhile, the city of Portland,
Oregon is considering adopting an anti-mask law in response to
repeated clashes between racist and anti-racist protesters.
12
These
examples conflict with the popular understanding that mask laws
were intended and used to target the Ku Klux Klan.
13
Klan members,
8
Id. at 205–09 (rejecting expressive speech claim and rejecting anonymous
speech claim).
9
See infra notes 11–19 and accompanying text (describing the uses of mask
bans outside of the Klan context).
10
Meagan Flynn, Georgia Police Invoke Law Made for KKK to Arrest Anti-
Racism Protesters, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2018, 5:42 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/04/23/georgia-
police-invoke-anti-mask-law-made-for-kkk-to-arrest-racism-
protesters/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1d12c52d45ab.
11
See Carol Robinson & Anna Beahm, Protest Organizer Carlos Chaverst
Jr. Arrested for 2nd Time in 48 Hours, BIRMINGHAMREAL-TIMENEWS (Dec. 13,
2018), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/2018/12/protest-organizer-carlos-
chaverst-jr-arrested-for-2nd-time-in-48-hours.html. Chaverst was protesting the
shooting of Emantic Fitzgerald Bradford Jr. who was shot at the Riverchase
Galleria on November 22, 2018. Id. Themask wearing charge came at a December
6
th
protest at Renaissance Ross Bridge. Id. Let me add that I was originally drawn
to this topic after I was asked by a local Birmingham reporter for my opinions on
the Alabama law. See Janae Pierre, Experts: Alabama’s Mask Law is Outdated,
WBHM (Jan. 16, 2019), https://wbhm.org/feature/2019/experts-alabamas-mask-
law-is-outdated/.
12
Zusha Elinson, Portland Considers Antimask Law Aimed at Antifa
Violence, WALL STREET J. (July 18, 2019, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/portland-considers-antimask-law-aimed-at-antifa-
violence-11563442203.
13
See Rob Kahn, Mask Bans as Expressions of Memory Politics in the
United States 8–10 (2019) (unpublished paper presented at Memory Laws in
Comparative European Perspective Conference, Brussels Belgium, May 2019)
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however, have faded as the central targets of such laws: over the past
several years, mask bans have been used (or proposed) against a
wide variety of mask wearers, including Antifa,
14
but also against
Muslims,
15
clowns
16
and peaceful protesters.
17
Indeed, the revival of
mask bans is a global phenomenon, as examples from around the
world attest.
18
[hereinafter Kahn, Mask Bans] (providing more examples to defeat the popular
notion that mask law bans were created to combat the Ku Klux Klan).
14
In 2017, an Arizona state legislator proposed a mask ban after comparing
Antifa to the Klan. Ben Giles, Legislator to Draft Law to Unmask Protesters He
Compares to KKK, ARIZ. CAP. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2017/08/23/jay-lawrence-law-to-unmask-
protesters-kkk/. In June 2018, New York Republican Representative Dan
Donovan introduced H.R. 6054, the “Unmasking Antifa Act of 2018,” which
provided 15-year prison sentences for mask wearing with the intent to intimidate
someone in the exercise of their constitutional rights. H.R. 6054, 115th Cong.
(2018).
15
In 2016, a Georgia lawmaker proposed amending the state’s mask ban to
replace “he” with “he or she,” a change that may have expanded the ban to cover
Islamic clothing that conceals the wearer’s identity. After Muslim Backlash,
Georgia Lawmaker Drops Change to No-Mask Law, CBS NEWS (Nov. 18, 2016,
10:27 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/muslim-backlash-georgia-
lawmaker-change-no-mask-law/ [hereinafter After Muslim Backlash].
16
In 2016, one Mississippi county responded to the scary clown panic by
banning clown masks until Halloween. See Austin Vining, Trick or Treat?:
Mississippi County Doesn’t Clown Around With Halloween Costumes, 36 MISS.
C. L. REV. 350, 351 (2018); see also Nicholas Mignanelli & Susan Siggelakis, No
Laughing Matter: Phantom Clowns, Moral Panic and the Law, 13 LSD J. 68, 71–
79, 82–89 (2017) (placing scary clown panic in broader context of the social role
of clowns and coulrophobia—the irrational fear of clowns).
17
In addition to the Georgia and Alabama cases described above, in 2014,
Atlanta police arrested protesters in downtown Atlanta wearing V for Vendetta
masks protesting a Ferguson, Missouri Grand Jury’s decision not to bring charges
against the killer of Michael Brown; the Eleventh Circuit defended the protesters’
arrest on the basis of qualified immunity. Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1295,
1301–02 (11th Cir. 2018).
18
Over the past decade, a number of European countries have enacted mask
bans, often in response to face veiling by Muslim women. See Dan Bilefsky &
Victor Homola, Austrian Parliament Bans Full Facial Veils in Public, N.Y.TIMES
(May, 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/world/europe/austria-
veil-ban-muslim.html (describing mask bans in France, Belgium and Austria). On
October 4, 2019, Mrs. Carrie Lam, the leader of Hong Kong, used the colonial-
era Emergency Regulations Ordinance to enact a mask ban in response to the
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The recent developments in mask law doctrine raise a puzzle and
a problem.
19
The puzzle refers to why courts began to favor mask
bans in the 1990s and 2000s—a time when the Klan was “a shadow
of its former self.”
20
This Article explores why, at pivotal moments
and in consideration of bans’ historical intentions, courts have
lurched toward greater restrictions on mask wearing.
21
The problem
with a state-friendly mask ban doctrine is, as noted above, that mask
laws are currently a growth industry, a growth exacerbated by the
expansion of mass surveillance.
22
At a moment when individuals
increasingly have rational reasons for wearing masks, mask bans are
more present than ever before, and First Amendment protection for
harmless, non-threatening (“innocent”) mask wearing has dropped
out of sight.
In The Tolerant Society, Lee Bollinger posits that tolerating
extremist speech makes society stronger by eliciting self-control
toward antisocial behavior; this is also the message of the Skokie
affair—tolerating extremists makes society freer by encouraging its
members to develop a thicker skin.
23
The hope behind this Article is
that a society with truly thick skin will learn to make peace not only
with offensive words, but also with masks, even when they are
scary. A society which understands that sometimes people don
masks, then, is a stronger society because it better respects the
human dignity and privacy rights of others.
This introduction describes the key doctrinal shifts that led to
Kerik’s conclusion that mask wearing never raises First Amendment
recent protests there. See James Pomfret & Greg Torode, Explainer: Hong Kong’s
Controversial Anti-Mask Ban and Emergency Regulations, REUTERS (Oct. 4,
2019, 8:35 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-
explainer/explainer-hong-kongs-controversial-anti-mask-ban-and-emergency-
regulations-idUSKBN1WJ1FM.
19
See infra Section I.D (discussing how despite the anti-mask laws’
connection to our nation’s past, these same laws monitor individuals completing
considerably mundane tasks).
20
Wayne R. Allen, Klan, Cloth and the Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and
the First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819, 827 (1991).
21
See, e.g., Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356
F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004); State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990); State v.
Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1996).
22
See infra Section I.D.
23
BOLLINGER, supra note 2, at 9.
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anonymity concerns and only raises speech concerns if the mask
carries a message independent of the rest of the wearer’s costume.
24
To provide context, it then relates the newfound popularity of mask
bans in the 1990s and 2000s to their usefulness in symbolically
repudiating the Ku Klux Klan in a society seeking to define itself as
colorblind and post-racial.
25
Finally, it addresses potential harms
posed by broad, all-encompassing mask bans and lays out the plan
for the rest of the Article.
26
B. Three Turning Points in Mask Law Doctrine
The first turning point on the long road from Skokie to Kerik
came in 1990, when in State v. Miller,
27
the Georgia Supreme Court
narrowed but ultimately sustained Georgia’s mask law
28
after a Klan
24
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205–09 (rejecting anonymity and expressive speech
claims of mask wearers).
25
See infra Section I.C.
26
See infra Section I.D. At this point let me offer a few caveats. First,
although there are great analogies between mask wearing and online anonymity,
my Article does not address online mask wearing. See Margot Kaminski, Real
Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to Anonymous
Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA&ENT. L.J. 815, 815 (2013).
It does, however, take up how social media and the internet may make physical
mask wearing necessary. See also infra Section IV.A (discussing the rise of mass
surveillance in the digital age). Second, my analysis focuses on the First
Amendment; as such I do not have much to say about whether mask bans violate
Equal Protection. While at least one court has considered such arguments, this is
not where most of the action is when it comes to mask bans. See, e.g., Ghafari v.
Mun. Court for S.F. Judicial Dist., 150 Cal. Rptr. 813, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(invalidating a mask ban on Equal Protection grounds). Finally, despite its length,
this is not a definitive, or even comprehensive discussion of all mask ban cases in
the United States; nor is it politically neutral. Rather, my Article begins from the
premise that mask law doctrine has, over the past forty years, lost its way and
offers impressionistic, heuristic arguments about why this may be the case and
how to restore the First Amendment to mask wearers.
27
398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990).
28
Georgia’s “Anti-Mask Act” provided as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he wears a mask,
hood, or device by which any portion of the face is so hidden,
concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the wearer
and is upon any public way or public property or upon the
78 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
member challenged the constitutionality of the statute as, in part,
violating his freedoms of speech and association (including his use
of symbolic speech) and as being overly broad.
29
In reaching this
conclusion, the majority relied heavily on the history of Klan terror
supposedly responsible for the passage of the Georgia law in 1951.
30
From the wider perspective of mask law doctrine, Miller is
significant because it departed from an earlier path charted by
Robinson v. State in which the Florida Supreme Court rejected the
state’s mask ban as overbroad.
31
private property of another without the written permission of
the owner or occupier of the property to do so.
(b) This Code section shall not apply to:
(1) A person wearing a traditional holiday costume on the
occasion of the holiday;
(2) A person lawfully engaged in trade and employment or in a
sporting activity where a mask is worn for the purpose of
ensuring the physical safety of the wearer, or because of the
nature of the occupation, trade or profession, or sporting
activity;
(3) A person using a mask in a theatrical production including
use in Mardi Gras celebrations and masquerade balls; or
(4) A person wearing a gas mask prescribed in emergency
management drills and exercises or emergencies.
GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-11-38 (West 2019).
29
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 549.
30
See id. at 549–50 (The court noted the inclusion of a “Statement of Public
Policy” in the Anti-mask Act, which was reflective of the legislature’s “awareness
of and concern over the dangers to society posed by anonymous vigilante
organizations.”).
31
Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1981). Section 876.13 of
the Florida statute at issue and then rejected as overbroad by the court provided:
No person or persons shall in this state, while wearing any
mask, hood, or device whereby any portion of the face is so
hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the
wearer, enter upon, or be, or appear upon or within the public
property of any municipality or county of the state.
Id. at 1076. One difference between the Georgia and Florida statutes is that the
Florida statute at issue in Robinson had no exceptions. Otherwise, the two statutes
were quite similar.
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A second turning point came in 1996.
32
In State v. Berrill, the
West Virginia Supreme Court decided a case involving an angry
parent who attended a school board meeting in a devil costume,
complete with a mask, to protest the high school’s devil mascot.
33
Given the setting, the defendant’s erratic behavior
34
and the fear it
engendered,
35
the court easily justified application of the state mask
ban by relying on the state’s interest in safety.
36
But the court went
further. Turning to the Spence v. Washington expressive content test
for First Amendment claimants
37
—something the court in Miller
conceded to the defendants without challenging
38
—it held that while
the defendant had an expressive intent (namely to show the audience
what it felt like to confront the devil),
39
this intent was not
understood by the audience.
40
Furthermore, the court noted that the
defendant was not prevented from “demonstrating his perception of
the evil appearance of the devil, as long as he did not conceal his
identity while doing so.”
41
The court concluded that the anti-mask
statute did not prevent the defendant from delivering his message,
and any restriction placed on his freedoms by the statute was, in fact,
minimal.
42
32
See generally State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1996) (upholding
the West Virginia state mask ban).
33
Id. at 509.
34
According to the court, the defendant “pranced” around the meeting room.
Id. at 510.
35
Some of the attendees worried that the defendant might have a gun. Id. at
516.
36
Id. at 515.
37
Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam) (A
First Amendment claimant must show “[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message” and that “the likelihood was great that the message would be understood
by those who viewed it.”). See generally Caitlin Housley, A Uniform Test Isn’t
Here Right Now, But Please Leave a Message: How Altering the Spence Symbolic
Speech Test Can Better Meet the Needs of an Expressive Society, 103 KY. L.J.
657 (2014–2015) (providing an overview of the Spence test).
38
State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550 n.2 (Ga. 1990).
39
Berrill, 474 S.E.2d at 516.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 515.
42
Id.
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The final turning point came in 2004 when the Second Circuit,
reversing the Southern District of New York, held in Kerik that
members of the Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan could not protest in New York City while masked.
43
In an
opinion by Judge José Cabranes, signed on to by now-Supreme
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Kerik took Berrill’s use of the
Spence test a step further.
44
The Second Circuit reasoned that the Ku
Klux Klan mask “does not communicate any message that the robe
and hood do not.”
45
In essence, Kerik constructed the following
standard: when a mask is accompanied by a costume, the mask must
have some expressive content independent of the costume to trigger
First Amendment protection for the wearer.
46
In addition, Kerik rejected the plaintiff’s freedom of association
claim.
47
This claim, based on NAACP v. Alabama
48
—and used in
several earlier cases that upheld challenges to mask bans
49
—
requires that the wearer show that he or she will face harassment if
forced to unmask, provided that the ordinance is not narrowly
tailored to a compelling state interest served by the mask ban.
50
Kerik, however, dispensed with American Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v. City of Goshen, with Ayran v. Mackey and with Ghafari v.
Municipal Court.
51
Instead, it categorically held that NAACP does
not apply to masks.
52
In the court’s words, “the Supreme Court has
never held that freedom of association or the right to engage in
43
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197
(2d Cir. 2004) rev’g 232 F. Supp. 2d 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
44
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205–08.
45
Id. at 206.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 209.
48
357 U.S. 449, 462 (1957) (recognizing “the vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations”).
49
See, e.g., Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp.
2d 835, 838 (N.D. Ind. 1999); Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex.
1978); Ghafari v. Mun. Court for S.F. Judicial Dist., 150 Cal. Rptr. 813, 819 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978). For example, the Klan members in Goshen presented evidence of
violence, job firings and other forms or retaliation.Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
50
Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (applying the compelling state interest test).
51
See Kerik, 356 F.3d 197;Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835; Aryan, 462 F. Supp.
90; Ghafari, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813.
52
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 209.
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anonymous speech entails a right to conceal one’s appearance in a
public demonstration. Nor has any Circuit found such a right.”
53
C. Mask Bans and White Supremacy
Behind these doctrinal changes are broader cultural questions.
What led courts to crack down on mask wearers? What made the
anti-Klan rationale so tempting? The 1950s provide a clue, as a time
when a series of southern states including South Carolina, Georgia
and Alabama enacted their mask bans.
54
These laws were enacted to
forestall desegregation by showing the nation as a whole that
“progressive” Southern elites were prepared to stand up to the
Klan—something that previously had not always been the case. In
effect, the Southern elites cast the Klan as the cause of bigotry and
racial antagonism while seeking to preserve segregation as
something in the best interests of everyone, including African
Americans.
55
In a similar fashion, the Georgia Supreme Court in Miller
invoked the history of Klan terror to sustain Georgia’s anti-mask
law
56
to demonize the Klan—and the Klan mask—and restore the
good name of the state without digging too deep into the lingering
question of white supremacy, including the mixed history behind the
passage of Georgia’s mask ban.
57
The trend toward demonizing the
Klan, while providing significant leniency to the broader system of
segregation, was also evident in a 1951 law review article by Jack
53
Id.
54
Alabama enacted its mask ban in 1949, and Georgia and South Carolina
enacted their bans in 1951. See Kahn, Mask Bans, supra note 13, at 20–21
(describing the passage of anti-mask laws in all three states).
55
See JASON MORGAN WARD, DEFENDING WHITE DEMOCRACY: THE
MAKING OF A SEGREGATIONIST MOVEMENT AND THE REMAKING OF RACIAL
POLITICS, 1936–1965 121–50 (2011); Kahn, Mask Bans, supra note 13, at 18–22.
56
State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550 (Ga. 1990).
57
While the Miller court quotes from a pamphlet describing the evils of
“public disguise” and quotes from Judge Osgood Williams, according to Ward,
one of the act’s sponsors Georgia Governor Herman Talmadge threw his support
behind the mask ban because his counterpart Governor Jimmy Byrnes had just
passed a similar bill in South Carolina. WARD, supra note 55, at 130–31; Kahn,
Mask Bans, supra note 13, at 20.
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Swertfeger Jr. appearing in the inaugural issue of the Journal of
Public Law.
58
While Swertfeger drafted a model anti-mask act that he hoped
would, by eliminating any intent requirement, “deal[] a staggering
blow to the Klan,”
59
he had little to say about segregation or white
supremacy. Indeed, when introducing the subject, he described the
“lawlessness of the Reconstruction period under the carpet-baggers
and Northern scalawags”
60
before quoting from a 1924 book
praising the Klan for playing “a most important role in the overthrow
of carpet-bag rule,” noting that “[b]urnings of cotton gins, petty
thievery and assaults upon women became rare.”
61
Similarly,
writing in the Georgia Law Review forty years later in defense of
mask bans in the wake of Miller, Wayne Allen referred to the Civil
War as the “War Between the States” and described the “horseback
rides by Klansmen dressed in sheets, grotesque masks and pointed
hats” as “initially prankish.”
62
The point of this critique is not to embarrass Swertfeger or Allen,
both of whom make thoughtful, persuasive cases for mask bans,
63
so much as to show how a concern to oppose the Klan, to set it aside
as particularly evil, can co-exist with a distancing of the more
difficultly defined evils of institutional racism and white
supremacy.
64
In this regard, a case likeMiller (and, to a lesser extent,
58
See Jack Swertfeger Jr., Comment: Anti-Mask and Anti-Klan Laws, 1 J.
PUB. L. 182, 182 (1951).
59
Id. at 192.
60
Id. at 182 n.2 (citation omitted).
61
Id. (quoting JOHN MOFFAT MECKLIN, THE KU KLUX KLAN: A STUDY OF
THEAMERICANMIND 65 (1924)).
62
Allen, supra note 20, at 822.
63
Swertfeger provides a useful distinction between mask bans that require a
showing of intent (weak laws) and those that make mask wearing a strict liability
offense (strong laws) and provides a draft anti-mask law. Swertfeger, supra note
58, at 188, 190. For his part, Allen makes an interesting distinction between
legislative purpose (a legal question) and legislative motive (a political question)
to explain how the Georgia legislature could pass a law targeting the Klan that
was, nevertheless, content neutral. Allen, supra note 20, at 843–45.
64
For more, see Kahn, Mask Bans, supra note 13, at 3–4 (describing the anti-
Klan mask laws as promoting a memory politics of distancing and deflecting
blame).
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Kerik)
65
operates as a law affecting memory
66
—not that different
from the taking down of a statue commemorating a Confederate
general, or the renaming of a public school or body of water doing
the same.
67
The purpose of these decisions is to make a disapproving
statement, and inMiller’s case, to show that even though Georgia is
not a utopia for race relations, it at least repudiates the Klan.
D. Masks and Surveillance
Unlike the definitive moment of removing a statue or renaming
a school,
68
however, mask bans make up an organic, living part of
criminal law. They are enforced by police officers and prosecutors
and are backed up with fines and, occasionally, prison sentences—
sometimes in situations not likely contemplated by the drafters.
69
Herein lies the problem with mask bans—one I did not sufficiently
65
Kerik contains an extended passage in which the Second Circuit describes
the history of New York’s anti-mask law which, as the court rightly notes,
predated the Klan but instead was “enacted in 1845 to thwart armed insurrections
by Hudson Valley tenant farmers who used disguises to attack law enforcement
officers.” Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
203 (2d Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit, however, gives what we shall see in Part
II: a somewhat overexcited account of the insurrection. See infra Part II.
66
See Eric Heinze, Epilogue: Beyond ‘Memory Laws’: Towards a General
Theory of Law and Historical Discourse of LAWANDMEMORY: TOWARDSLEGAL
GOVERNANCE OF HISTORY 413–33 (Uladizislau Belavusau & Aleksandra
Gilszcyńska-Grabias eds., 2017).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
The mask ban described in Walpole v. State, 68 Tenn. 370, 371 (Tenn.
1878), carried a prison term of ten to twenty years. Id. (describing Act 1869-70,
ch. 54, sec. 2, T &S. Rev. sec 4770). Modern mask bans are more lenient, but
some still allow for imprisonment. For example, GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-11-38
treats mask wearing as a misdemeanor which, under GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-3,
is punishable by a $1,000 fine or up to twelve months’ imprisonment. On the other
hand, in Alabama and New York, mask wearing is a violation. See ALA. CODE
§13A-11-9 (treating mask wearing as a form of loitering which, in turn, is a
violation); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35. On the other hand, under the proposed
Unmasking Antifa Act, mask wearers would face fifteen-year sentences (with two
additional years if destruction of property is involved). See H.R. 6054, 115th
Cong. §§ 2–3 (2018).
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appreciate when writing about them over a decade ago.
70
The mask
bans are not simply symbolic monuments to the evil of the Klan or
our racist past. The mask bans are used, against real, live mask
wearers—not all of whom are racists or members of violent
organizations, like what Antifa is imagined to be.
71
What, for
example, was the message conveyed by the Georgia legislator who
wanted to make sure that mask bans applied to women as well as
men?
72
Moreover, many state mask bans—what Swertfeger calls
“strong” mask bans
73
—punish all public mask wearing in a given
jurisdiction subject to a small range of exceptions (such as
masquerade balls or masks used for climate or health reasons).
74
70
Robert A. Kahn, Cross-Burning, Holocaust Denial and the Development
of Hate Speech Law in the United States and Germany, 83 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 163, 176 (2005–2006) [hereinafter Kahn, Cross-Burning] (explaining the
outcome in Miller by arguing that some “hateful acts . . . resonate so strongly”
that they “imperil not only the victim but also the identity of the larger society as
tolerant and non-racist”).
71
There does not seem to be a clear idea about who or what “Antifa” is. For
instance, two writers eager to protect businesses against violent protests can only
say that Antifa “operate[s] without any centralized leadership or any one
organization” but often uses violent methods to achieve goals of “peace and
inclusivity.” John I. Winn & Kevin H. McGovern, Defending Public Safety and
Business Infrastructure: Effective Statutory Responses to Black Bloc Terrorism,
57 WASHBURN L.J., 1, 3 (2018). Despite the difficulty in identifying the group,
350,000 people signed a petition calling on the White House to declare “AntiFa”
a terror group. Id. at 4.
72
See After Muslim Backlash, supra note 15. To be fair, most statutes would
be better using gender neutral language. In addition, precise language can narrow
the scope of mask bans and lessen the risk of arbitrary enforcement. On the other
hand, expanding a mask ban to make sure that it covers (Muslim) women
accomplishes neither of these goals. Instead, it feeds into a larger trend in Europe
to outlaw the burqa and niqab with bans whose facially neutral language has a
clear target—Muslim clothing. See Marie Haspeslagh, [The Belgian Burqa-Ban]
Unveiled from a human rights perspective, 15–16, 20, 23, (May 13, 2012) (Master
Thesis. Faculty of Law, University of Ghent) (describing how Belgium’s 2011
mask ban, while punishing the state of being “unrecognizable,” was motivated by
concerns about Islam in general and the burqa in particular).
73
Swertfeger, supra note 58, at 188.
74
Alabama exempts masquerade parties, public parades, presentations “of
an educational, religious or historical character” and sporting events. ALA. CODE
§§ 13A-11-9(b), 13A-11-140 (2019). Meanwhile, Georgia exempts “traditional
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These laws, in theory, could be used to punish someone who wears
a mask while mowing the lawn, taking out garbage, or going to the
grocery store. While one might object and insist that the police are
too busy to go after every last lawn-mowing mask wearer, there are
instances of such enforcement, such as in Daniels v. State,
75
in
which a man, playing with neighborhood children he knew, was
stopped by the police and arrested because he was wearing a mask.
76
How does the arrest of a middle-aged African American man living
on Supplemental Security Income further the mission of
symbolically repudiating the Ku Klux Klan?
77
But the problem with mask bans—aside from the divergent
issues of potential arbitrary enforcement or absurd results—runs
deeper in that mask wearing today may actually be a reasonable
response to life in our increasingly digital world. For instance, in
1990, when the Georgia Supreme Court decidedMiller,
78
no one had
a smart phone.
79
If a mask wearer removed the mask, someone could
snap a picture, but the photographer would have to get the film
developed before ever seeing the image. Today, it’s not quite like
that. Unsuspecting people from the community go to—for
instance—the Unite the Right rally, are seen on national TV, and
holiday costumes,” masks worn for safety purposes while engaged in an
occupation, trade, profession or sporting activity, masks worn as part of a
theatrical production (including Mardi Gras celebrations and masquerade balls)
and gas masks used during preparedness drills and emergencies. GA. CODE. ANN.
§ 16-11-38(b)(1)-(4). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4) (McKinney 2019)
(exempting masquerade parties “or like entertainment” when the entertainment
takes place in a city that regulates such entertainment and the mask wearer has
received permission).
75
448 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1994).
76
While the Georgia Supreme Court ultimately threw out the charges against
Daniels, the Court of Appeals sided with Georgia, albeit in a split decision.
Daniels v. State, 438 S.E.2d 99, 101–02 (Ga. App. 1993).
77
The details about Daniels come from the appellate brief his lawyer filed to
the Georgia Supreme Court. Brief of Petitioner, Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d 185
(1994), (No. S94G0362), 1994 WL16056819, at *3–6.
78
See generally State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990) (reversing the
trial court’s decision and denying reconsideration in December 1990).
79
Steven Tweedle, The World’s First Smartphone, Simon, Was Created 15
Years Before the iPhone, BUS. INSIDER (June 14, 2015, 8:00 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/worlds-first-smartphone-simon-launched-
before-iphone-2015-6.
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lose their jobs.
80
It seems unfair. Everyone today is just one temper
tantrum away from being captured on a viral video that hits the front
page of MSN or the Huffington Post.
81
Compounding this issue is
the heightened concern with privacy, as cities increasingly rely on
facial recognition technology in their surveillance programs.
82
Given all of this, perhaps mask wearing is a reasonable response to
modern life.
There’s just one problem—the law (as currently constituted)
simply will not let us wear masks. While Robinson struck down a
mask ban because it was overbroad,
83
no court has done so since
then. Although it speaks for only the Second Circuit, the message in
Kerik is clear—NAACP, which recognized a strong relationship
between freedom to associate and privacy in an individual’s
associations—does not apply to mask wearers.
84
Nor will a symbolic
speech claim fare much better. Scott Skinner-Thompson makes the
interesting argument that, in an age of surveillance, masks send a
message of resistance,
85
much as the masks worn by Iranian students
80
After the 2017 protests Charlottesville, Virginia, right-wing participants
were identified by photos and targeted. See Maura Judkis, Charlottesville White
Nationalist Demonstrator Loses Job at a Libertarian Hot Dog Shop, WASH. POST
(Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/food/wp/2017/08/14/charlottesville-
white-nationalist-demonstrator-fired-from-libertarian-hot-dog-shop/.
81
For example, as I am writing this section of the paper, MSN has a story of
two hunters who were caught kissing after killing a lion. The photo went viral,
which led the company that organized the safari that organized the lion hunt to
disable its Facebook page. SeeCaitlin O’Kane,Couple’s Kissing Photo with Dead
Lion Goes Viral, MSN (July 17, 2019), https://www.msn.com/en-
us/news/world/couples-kissing-photo-with-dead-lion-goes-viral/ar-AAEteJh.
82
For a discussion of facial recognition technology, see Sanil Chinoy, The
Racist History Behind Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/opinion/facial-recognition-race.html
(describing dubious use of facial recognition technology to identify emotional
states of individuals).
83
Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1981).
84
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
209 (2d Cir. 2004).
85
See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1673, 1703 (2017) (noting “[t]he expressive power of attempts at physical
obfuscation” such as masks).
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protesting the Shah described in Aryan
86
became symbols of protest.
In Berrill, however, the court suggested that the defendant could
convey his dislike for the school mascot without wearing a devil
mask.
87
Likewise, there are many ways to protest the lack of privacy
in modern life that do not involve wearing a mask.
88
Finally, under
Kerik, a privacy protester should be wary of what he or she wears
along with the mask
89
—lest the court conclude that the mask adds
nothing not already conveyed by,
90
for example, the protester’s
black turtleneck sweater.
86
In Aryan, Iranian students sought to protest the Iranian Shah on their
campus at Texas Tech University. The university granted a permit for the protest,
provided that the students not wear masks, on the theory that similar protests had
involved violence and that anonymity might permit, if not encourage, additional
violence. The students petitioned the court for a temporary restraining order,
keeping the no-mask condition from limiting the protest. The court held that the
condition violated the students’ rights regarding the masks’ non-communicative
functions: despite Texas Tech’s great interest in preventing on-campus violence,
many students would be afraid to march in protest because they “feared reprisals
from the Shah.” Forcing the students to give up their anonymity, the court held,
equated to a prohibition on their speech. Additionally, the court held that the
masks served a communicative purpose in that they had gained significance as
symbols of opposition to the Shah’s oppressive regime. Texas Tech argued that
the students’ actions violated the constitutional rights of the Shah’s son, the
Prince, who lived near the university, because their use of masks constituted
actions prohibited by what the opinion terms the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (2018), but the court rejected this argument. Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F.
Supp. 90, 91–92 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
87
State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 515 (W. Va. 1996).
88
See, e.g., Michele Gilman, Voices of the Poor Must Be Heard in the Data
Privacy Debate, JURIST (May 14, 2019, 10:09 AM),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/05/voices-of-the-poor-must-be-heard-
in-the-data-privacy-debate/; Bobbie Johnson &Afua Hirsh, Facebook Backtracks
After Online Privacy Protest, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2009, 19:01 EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/feb/19/facebook-personal-data;
Jaikumar Vijayan, Privacy Groups Protest CISPA Bill, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb.
14, 2013, 4:03 PM PST),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2495030/privacy-groups-protest-cispa-
bill.html.
89
See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d
197, 206 (2d Cir. 2004).
90
Id.
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So that is our dilemma. The rest of this Article will address what
led courts to narrow First Amendment protections for mask wearers
and how mask wearing can be restored to its rightful place in the
First Amendment pantheon. Part II gives a history of mask bans,
starting from 1845 when New York enacted the nation’s first mask
ban (more than twenty years before the rise of the Ku Klux Klan)
and extending through the mid-1970s.
91
Part III returns to the scene
of the crime—Kerik, Miller and Berrill
92
—and explores how over a
four-decade period, judges narrowed First Amendment protections
of mask wearers, often with the help of the historical models
outlined in Part II.
93
Part IV turns to present day.
94
In an age of mass surveillance and
facial recognition technology, masks seem more necessary than
ever. Yet in Gates v. Khokhar, a federal court once again slammed
the door shut on mask wearers.
95
Despite the Pandora’s Box of mask
ban proposals,
96
however, there is hope. In a bracing dissent in
Gates, Judge Kathleen Williams provides a roadmap for bringing
masks back into the First Amendment mainstream.
97
This Article
then concludes with a few brief comments about the future of mask
law doctrine.
98
II. TWO STORIESABOUTMASKBANS
Before diving deeper into Church of the American Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik,
99
State v. Miller,
100
and State v. Berrill,
101
we
must place the mask bans in a broader historical perspective. To that
91
Infra Part II.
92
See Kerik, 356 F.3d 197; State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990); State
v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1996).
93
Infra Part III.
94
Infra Part IV.
95
Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1295, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2018).
96
See supra notes 10–18 and accompanying text.
97
See Gates, 884 F.3d at 1305 (Williams, J., dissenting in part).
98
Infra Conclusion.
99
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197
(2d Cir. 2004).
100
State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990).
101
State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1996).
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end, this Part offers two competing stories one can tell about
masks—one about New York’s mask ban centered on state
security,
102
and another about using mask bans to repudiate the Ku
Klux Klan.
103
As we shall see in Part III, both stories contributed to
the tightening of mask law doctrine in the 1990s and 2000s.
104
That
said, the story of state security behind the New York mask ban
105
is
more amenable to moderating influences than the story of symbolic
repudiation of hate behind the anti-Klan mask bans.
A. New York: Mask Bans, Anxiety and State Security
New York passed its mask ban in 1845 as a response to the
Renters’ War of the 1840s, during which tenants dressed up as
“Indians,” donned masks and challenged attempts by state officials
to collect back rent.
106
While the mask ban has been on the books
since then, the State of New York made peace with the renters,
conceding most of their demands during the late 1840s.
107
What
remains from the New York experience is the general idea that
masks are threatening, and that states, in assessing these threats, pass
laws that have lasting consequences.
108
At the same time, courts
102
See infra Section II.A.
103
See infra Section II.B.
104
See infra Part III.
105
See infra Section II.A.
106
REEVE HUSTON, LAND AND FREEDOM: RURAL SOCIETY, POPULAR
PROTEST, AND PARTY POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM NEW YORK 146–50 (2000);
Arthur E. Sutherland, The Tenantry on the New York Manors: A Chapter of Legal
History, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 620, 626–27 (1956) (describing the passage of the
original ban); see Kahn, Mask Bans, supra note 13, at 8–10.
107
Sutherland, supra note 106, at 632–37 (describing legislative gains for
the tenants).
108
For instance, aside from being used against anarchists (People v. Aboaf,
721 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2001)) and the Klan (Church of the Am.
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004))—groups that
present (theoretically at least) a threat to the state—the New York mask ban has
been used against people who pose no such threat. See People v. Archibald, 296
N.Y.S.2d 834, 835–36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (applying mask ban to a man
dressed in women’s clothing at a subway station at 4:00 AM); cf. People v.
Luechini, 136 N.Y.S 319, 320–21 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1912) (throwing out the
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interpreting New York’s mask law today do not generally hearken
back to the Renters’ War in their opinions.
109
The Second Circuit ruling in Kerik is a notable exception.
110
The
picture painted of the Renters’ War in Kerik is one of “armed
insurrections” by “tenant farmers” who “used disguises to attack law
enforcement officers.”
111
As the Second Circuit describes it, these
anti-renters, faced with “[d]epressions in the price[] of wheat and
the loss of soil productivity,”
112
fell into debt, which posed problems
when landlord Stephen Van Rensselaer IV “demanded repayment of
outstanding debts, and sought to evict tenants who did not pay.”
113
In response, some anti-renters mustered funds for litigation and
lobbying, while others “formed bands of so-called ‘Indians,’
disguised in calico gowns and leather masks, who forcibly thwarted
landlords’ efforts to serve farmers with process or conduct distress
sales.”
114
According to the court, “[t]he operations of [these] masked
Indians commonly involved intimidation, and sometimes tarring
and feathering, but also caused three deaths from 1844–45,
including the death of a sheriff.”
115
In response to this “civil unrest,” the court continued, in January
1845, the legislature passed “[a]n Act to prevent persons appearing
disguised and armed.”
116
The law authorized the arrest of anyone
who “appear[s] in any road or public highway, or in any field, lot,
wood, or enclosure” whose face is “painted, discolored, covered or
conviction of a mask wearer in front of a motion picture house who claimed to
represent “the White Slave”).
109
For instance, the majority opinion in Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, does
not mention the Renters’ War, nor does the court in Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725. See
also Luechini, 136 N.Y.S 319 (lacking any mention of the Renters’ War).
110
Kerik, 356 F.3d. at 203–05; see also Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 837
(Markowitz, J., dissenting) (describing the Renters’ War to show the legislature
was not concerned with non-violent men appearing in women’s attire).
111
Kerik, 356 F.3d. at 203.
112
Id. at 204.
113
Id. The Second Circuit notes Stephen Van Rensselaer IV’s father,
Stephen Van Rensselaer III, was known as the “Good Patroon” (the good
landlord), without explaining how the father got that name. Id.
114
Id. (citing HUSTON, supra note 106, at 116–19).
115
Id. (citing HUSTON, supra note 106, at 120, 146–50).
115
Id.
116
Id. (quoting Laws of the State of New York, 68th sess., at 5–7).
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concealed, or being otherwise disguised in a manner calculated to
prevent him from being identified.”
117
Such a person was to be
brought before a judge and, unless the person gave “a good account
of himself,” deemed a vagrant and sentenced to six months in jail.
118
According to Governor Silas Wright, the mask law was necessary
because “the disguises of . . . organized bands calling themselves
Indians” made it difficult for “eye witnesses on the spot” to identify
the perpetrators.
119
Governor Wright added that the new law would
“aid in the prevention of the crimes which recently ha[d] been so
daringly committed.”
120
From this historical overview, the Kerik
court concluded that “New York’s anti-mask law was therefore
indisputably aimed at deterring violence and the apprehension of
wrongdoers” rather than purporting “to suppress any particular
viewpoint.”
121
The Second Circuit’s finding about viewpoint discrimination
highlights an important distinction between the New York and anti-
Klan stories about mask bans: as we shall see, it is much harder to
argue credibly that other anti-mask bans were not motivated by
intent to suppress the Klan (even if the statutes themselves are
facially neutral).
122
As such, this decision represents a strength of
the New York mask ban’s story of state security. That said, Kerik
also raises a weakness of the state security discourse—namely, that
governments sometimes overreach and create statutes that are more
restrictive than necessary.
123
To that end, consider what theKerik account of the Renters’War
and the enactment of the 1845 mask law leaves out. To begin with,
the court’s characterization of the renters’ grievances is one-
117
Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
118
Id.
119
Id. (quoting STATE OF N.Y., 4 MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS 149
(Charles Z. Lincoln ed., 1909)) (internal quotations omitted).
120
Id. at 205 (quoting STATE OF N.Y., 4 MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS
149 (Charles Z. Lincoln ed., 1909)) (internal quotations omitted).
121
Id. at 205.
122
For more, see Allen, supra note 20, at 843–45 (conceding that Georgia’s
mask ban had an anti-Klan motive but holding that this was irrelevant).
123
See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d
197, 202 (2d Cir. 2004).
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dimensional.
124
For the Kerik court, the renters are victims of the
forces of nature and history—cheap wheat and bad soil.
125
As
students of origins of revolution well know, however, it is not bad
conditions that bring about revolutionary upsurges so much as when
good times are followed by a sudden downturn.
126
The same was
true for the anti-rent tenants.
127
Stephen Rensselaer III was called
the “Good Poltroon” for a reason—he refused to collect back rents
from tenants and promised not to collect them after he died.
128
The
decision of his son Stephen Van Rensselaer IV to collect the rents
was one of the precipitating causes of the Renters’ War.
129
In other
words, the renters who donned masks were not last-gasp farmers
lashing out; they felt a promise made to them by the Van Rensselaers
had been broken.
130
Similar problems exist with Kerik’s description of the so-called
Indians’ “operations.”
131
While the court was right that the anti-
renters intimidated state officials, tarred and feathered some, and
that three law enforcement officials ultimately died at the hands of
the “Indians,”
132
the actual story is less threatening than the court
made it out to be. Importantly, not all the interactions between law
enforcement and the anti-renter mask wearers were adversarial.
133
When the disguised protesting tenants knew that a sheriff was
enforcing a sale of property against his will, they were cordial, if not
downright friendly. For instance, in a part of Reeve Huston’s Land
and Freedom: Rural Society, Popular Protest, and Party Politics in
124
See id. at 204–05 (viewing renters as victims of bad economic
conditions).
125
Id. at 204.
126
See JACKGOLDSTONE, REVOLUTIONS: AVERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 11
(2014) (describing how some scholars attribute revolutions to “relative
deprivation” and arguing that “when people’s expectations for further progress
are dashed, they rise up in protest”).
127
See Kerik, 356 F.3d at 204.
128
See id.
129
See Sutherland, supra note 106, at 626.
130
Id. at 625.
131
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 204.
132
Id.
133
HUSTON, supra note 106, at 120.
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Antebellum New York cited to in Kerik,
134
the author relates that one
band of Indians, after stopping an eviction, marched the sheriff
involved to a local tavern for a glass of brandy.
135
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s statement about the three deaths
and their relation to the passage of the mask law
136
is somewhat
misleading. According to Huston, on December 18, 1844, a group
of masked Indians rushed into an anti-renter rally.
137
As they
entered, “they whopped, yelled, and fired their pistols into the air,”
killing a young farm hand with a stray shot.
138
The next death
occurred the following day when, according to Huston, a group of
five men hauling timber from a lot were attacked by a band of fifty
Indians.
139
One of the men had just purchased a lot from William
Van Rensselaer.
140
When the Indians attacked, one of the men
charged the Indians with an axe.
141
In response, an Indian pointed a
pistol at the man, warning the axe-wielding attacker that he would
shoot.
142
In the fracas that ensued, one Indian shot the attacker, who
died from his wounds.
143
These incidents led to a swift reaction.
144
Opposing newspaper
editors described the anti-renter movement as an “insurrection,” and
local officials called out the militia. It was against this background
that Governor Silas Wright appealed to the state legislature to, in
Huston’s words, “make the act of appearing armed and in disguise
a felony.”
145
At the same time, some anti-renters worried that the
activities of the Indians would alienate support for the broader anti-
rent cause and urged for the Indians to disband.
146
134
Kerik, 365 F.3d at 204 (citing HUSTON, supra note 106, at 120, 146–50).
135
HUSTON, supra note 106, at 120.
136
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 204.
137
HUSTON, supra note 106, at 147.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 147–48.
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Initially, the Indians continued their attacks while decrying the
new law, which they saw as a conspiracy to “crush the anti-rent
movement” and “suppress[] their civil liberties.”
147
The raids
continued in part because the legislative strategy promoted by the
broader anti-rent movement could not ensure “the protection of
specific kin and neighbors” targeted by the evictions.
148
Things
continued this way until August 1845, when a confrontation
between a band of Indians and a sheriff’s posse led to a third killing,
triggering a wave of state repression that broke the back of the mask-
wearing Indians.
149
These events unfolded as follows. On August 7, 1845, a band of
between 100 and 200 Indians were protesting a distress sale.
150
When a sheriff tried to lead cattle off the sale property, the Indians
surrounded the cattle—a tactic that, before the December 1844
events, would have led the sheriff to back down.
151
Instead, a deputy
sheriff and a constable rode into the Indians, guns drawn; in
response, the Indian “chief” told the tribe to shoot at the horses.
152
While the horses were killed, so too was the deputy sheriff.
153
In
response, Governor Wright declared three counties to be in a state
of rebellion and sent in troops.
154
According to Huston, these forces
“adopted something like the Indians’ tactics of intimidation,”
breaking into houses and shooting at anti-rent sympathizers.
155
The
impact of these actions was “devastating”—according to Huston,
entire neighborhoods were stripped of their young men as those not
arrested fled across the border to Pennsylvania.
156
Assuming Huston’s historical account is accurate, Kerik’s
description of the killings and their connection to the 1845 anti-mask
147
Id. at 148. Huston quotes an anti-renter call to action, critiquing those
“impish lords” who “make it a crime, for you, to speak your wrongs.” Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 149.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 150.
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law is problematic.
157
Firstly, all three killings had an “accidental”
quality to them.
158
The Indians did not ride into the farmland with
the intent to kill sheriffs, deputies and constables.
159
Indeed, two of
the three killings—the farmhand killed by the stray shot and the axe-
wielding timber hauler—did not involve state officials at all.
160
The
killing of the sheriff in August 1845 was a different matter, but this
occurred after the passage of the anti-mask law—not before, as the
Kerik opinion can be read to suggest.
161
At the same time, the
disguised tenants themselves recognized the exceptional nature of
the August 1845 killing.
162
According to Arthur E. Sutherland, “It
was all very well to dress up as an Indian, carry a gun, blow a horn
on a mountainside, and boast about what would be done to any of
the landlords’ men if they tried their tricks, but murder was
different.”
163
Finally, there is the question of the aftermath of the anti-rent
movement. Kerik speaks of “armed insurrections,”
“crimes . . . daringly committed” and “the apprehension of
wrongdoers.”
164
Given this language, one might expect that the
Indians and the anti-renters were relegated to the dustbin of history.
In reality, the anti-renter movement won a series of electoral
victories in the Spring of 1845
165
and by 1848 had achieved a
157
See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d
197, 203–05 (2d Cir. 2004).
158
See supra notes 137–44, 150–54 and accompanying text.
159
See HUSTON, supra note 106, at 119–20 (describing how the “natives”
knew “how to distinguish between friend and foe” and recognized that “even
sympathetic sheriffs had to serve process”).
160
Id. at 147.
161
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 204.WhileKerik accurately recounts that these killings
took place in 1844 and 1845, the organization of the opinion—which mentions
the killings first, and then takes up the decision to enact an anti-mask act—gives
the impression that all three killings took place before the mask act was passed.
162
Sutherland, supra note 106, at 627.
163
Id.
164
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205.
165
HUSTON, supra note 106, at 151–52.
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number of their goals, including adding a ban on feudal rents to the
New York State Constitution.
166
Kerik makes no mention of this.
167
Taken collectively, Kerik’s historical discussion of the 1845
mask ban shows how the rationale of state security can be
exaggerated to justify suppression of civil liberties—in this case,
mask wearing.
168
The mask wearers are presented as killers, even
though the killings were isolated and arose under exceptional
circumstances, and the last killing led the Indians to disband.
169
They were presented as outsiders, even though within three years of
the passage of the mask ban, the Indians and the anti-rent movement
achieved most of their political aims.
170
At the same time, there are some grounds for hope. The story is
one of a frightened governor and state legislature responding to a
pair of killings on successive days. Governor Wright’s call for the
mask bans was narrow—the intent was to punish armed mask
wearers.
171
While the ultimate ban was broader, it contained a
provision according to which the wearer could avoid prison by
giving “a good account of himself.”
172
Finally, the anti-renters
“won” the war. Mask wearing is not, therefore, just about outsiders
who commit criminal acts: it is about social groups that succeed
politically, but when it comes to mask wearing, sometimes go too
far with their tactics.
173
More generally, New York’s 1845 mask ban was enacted during
a social crisis that lasted about four years.
174
While the law has been
166
Sutherland, supra note 106, at 632–33.
167
See generally Kerik, 365 F.3d 197 (lacking any mention of how the anti-
renter movement won elections or successfully added a federal rent ban to the
New York State Constitution).
168
Id. at 203 (describing activities of tenant farmers as an “armed
insurrection”).
169
See supra notes 137–44, 150–54 and accompanying text.
170
See Sutherland, supra note 106, at 632 (describing political gains of the
renters in the late 1840s).
171
HUSTON, supra note 106, at 147 (The governor “called . . . to make the
act of appearing armed and in disguise a felony.”).
172
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 204 (citing Laws of the State of New York, 68th sess.,
at 5).
173
This is one way of describing Antifa.
174
The first masked Indians appeared in 1841. HUSTON, supra note 106, at
116. The first acts of violence described by the Kerik court (see Kerik, 356 F. 3d
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on the books for over 170 years and has been interpreted strictly,
175
the story it tells about mask wearing does not support the narrowing
of First Amendment protections for mask wearers seen in Kerik,
Miller and Berrill.
176
If the ban were truly about “armed
insurrection,” there should be no problem allowing as-applied
challenges to it based on anonymity and symbolic speech concerns.
In essence, the story behind the 1845mask ban is based on the power
of the United States (or its constituent individual states) to counter
“true threats.”
177
When no true threat is present, mask wearing
should not be prohibited. As we shall see, the story behind anti-Klan
mask bans is quite different.
B. Anti-Klan Mask Bans as an Expression of Moral
Outrage
Most mask bans were directed against the Ku Klux Klan.
178
Unlike the New York 1845 mask ban, enacted largely on security
grounds against a transient threat,
179
the anti-Klan mask bans carried
a message of moral repudiation, one that complicates the task of
opposing mask bans.
180
If the Klan is evil, then a mask ban becomes
a necessary secondary evil. While the moral defense of mask bans
is most evident inMiller,
181
the theme of good versus evil plays out
during all three major periods of Klan activity.
182
at 203–04) took place in December 1844. HUSTON, supra note 106, at 147. The
final killing took place in August 1845. Id.
175
See People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835–36 (N.Y. App. Div.
1968) (applying mask ban to a man dressed as a woman).
176
See, e.g., Kerik, 356 F.3d 197; State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990);
State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1996).
177
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S 705, 707–08 (1969) (distinguishing
threats from constitutionally protected speech).
178
See Swertfeger, supra note 58, at 182 (describing anti-mask laws as
primarily “directed at the Ku Klux Klan”).
179
See supra Section II.A.
180
See infra Section II.B.
181
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 550–51.
182
Here I follow David Chalmers, who distinguishes between a First Klan
active during Reconstruction, a Second Klan active in the 1920s and a Third Klan
active in the 1940s and 1950s. See DAVID CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM:
THEHISTORY OF THEKUKLUXKLAN 2–7 (1981).
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The first Klan of the 1860s and early 1870s terrorized African
Americans and sought to drum up opposition to Reconstruction.
183
When early Klan activity was local, it was dismissed as innocent or
exaggerated.
184
Against this atmosphere, measures like the 1870
Enforcement Act
185
(which included an anti-mask provision) had
two functions: on the one hand, they expanded the ability of the
federal government to combat the Klan; on the other, they conveyed
the message that despite skepticism, the Klan was a serious
problem.
186
The courts knew this as well. For instance, in Walpole v. State,
a criminal defendant sought review of a Tennessee circuit court
decision which convicted him of violating mask-ban provisions of
the Tennessee Code colloquially known as the Ku Klux law.
187
The
court explained to the defendant robber caught in a chicken coop
wearing a mask that, while the ten-year minimum penalty under
Tennessee’s mask law might seem unfair, these penalties “have
proved themselves wholesome in the partial suppression of the
greatest of the disturbing elements of social order in this State.”
188
Likewise, in Dale v. Gunter,
189
the Alabama Supreme Court
interpreted an 1868 statute requiring the state to pay $5,000 to a
widow or widower whose spouse was killed by an outlaw, or by “a
person or persons in disguise,” and recited from the Preamble of the
1868 law that “men . . . under the cover of masks, armed with
knives, revolvers and other deadly weapons . . . generally in the late
hours of the night . . . commit violence and outrages upon peaceable
183
See Kahn, Mask Bans, supra note 13, at 11–14.
184
Elaine Frantz Parsons, Klan Skepticism and Denial in Reconstruction Era
Public Discourse, 77 J. S. HIST. 53, 76 (2011).
185
18 U.S.C. § 241 (2018) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1996)).
186
Parsons, supra note 184, at 57–78. According to Parsons, Klan denial
helped undermine Reconstruction by showing, in the minds of Klan supporters, at
least that “freed people and their allies . . . were terrified and superstitious people
who could be manipulated by absurd theatrical displays and who, therefore, would
make poor citizens.” Id. at 83–87.
187
Walpole v. State, 68 Tenn. 370, 370–71 (Tenn. 1878).
188
Id. at 373.
189
46 Ala. 118 (1871).
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and law abiding citizens.”
190
These early courts focused on what the
mask bans represented
191
rather than on why or whether they were
necessary. The United States had just gone through a bloody war
and was struggling with Reconstruction.
192
As the court in Walpole
noted, the object of mask bans “was to repress a great evil which
arose in this country after the war.”
193
In the 1920s, the nature of the Klan and the function of mask
laws changed, but the general moral message of repudiating the
Klan did not. The Second Klan was a mass organization with
millions of members—some of whom used masks so that they could
maintain positions in society without revealing their Klan identities,
thereby sending the message that the Klan and social institutions
were aligned.
194
This was because the Klan—in addition to targeting
African Americans, Jews, Catholics and immigrants—also sought
to replace the old order, especially in the South.
195
One way the Klan
would do this was by using their masks to conceal their identities.
For example, in Arizona, masked Klan members often went to
churches during Sunday services to make donations.
196
As a result, mask bans were less about stopping night riders from
committing unspeakable crimes than about identifying the
supposedly good citizens of the community who hid behind the
shield of anonymity. Opponents of the Klan focused on the mask’s
190
Id. at 137, 140–41. On the other hand, the court held against the plaintiff,
a widow whose husband was killed by an attacker lying in the bushes, which the
court held was an ambush and not a disguise. Id. at 143.
191
See, e.g.,Walpole, 68 Tenn. at 371–72 (presenting the “great evil” of the
Klan as self-explanatory).
192
Civil War and Reconstruction, LIBR. CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/prese
ntations/timeline/civilwar/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
193
Walpole, 68 Tenn. at 371–72.
194
See Kahn, Mask Bans, supra note 13, at 14–18.
195
See Paul M. Pruitt Jr., Historic Notes and Document: Judge Henry D.
Clayton and “A Klansman”: A Revealing Exchange of Views, 81 FLA. HIST. Q.
323, 334 (2003) (describing how Southern elites had “come to view the Klan as
an altogether too-successful challenger of traditional Democratic machines”).
196
See Sue Wilson Abbey, The Ku Klux Klan in Arizona, 1921–25, 14 J.
ARIZ. HIST. 10, 13 (1973).
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falsity rather than on its tendency to cause violence.
197
For instance,
W.E.B. Dubois argued that the Klan, as a group, was “sworn to lie,”
adding, “It does not make any difference what the Ku Klux Klan is
fighting for or against. Its method is wrong and dangerous and
uncivilized.”
198
Addressing a 1922 meeting of the Florida Bar
Association, Florida Judge Henry D. Clayton—of Clayton Anti-
Trust Act fame
199
—argued that there was “no place for an invisible
empire in the United States, nor reason for clan or gang to do any
part of the business of governing or correcting or punishing citizens
or a citizen.”
200
Clayton added that “the confidence begotten by the
possession of the power of numbers and secrecy accompanied by
intolerance make manifest the harm to come from secret
organizations.”
201
Worse still, the Klan outrages “are not
perpetuated as the avowed acts of criminals of miscreants but are
committed under the guise and pretense of morality, reform and
uplift”—something Clayton saw as a form of “self-deception.”
202
The concern about the Klan secrecy came to the fore in 1928 in
People of the State of New York ex. rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,
203
where the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of a
New York law requiring unincorporated organizations of over
twenty members that administer an oath as a condition of
membership to file a membership list with the secretary of state’s
office.
204
The statute made an exception for labor unions.
205
In
Zimmerman, a relator who belonged to the Buffalo Provisional Klan
of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was charged for failing to satisfy
the reporting requirement.
206
In explaining why the exemption for
labor unions did not raise Equal Protection concerns, the Court
197
See, e.g., W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Shape of Fear, 223 N. AM. REV.
291, 294, 302–04 (1926) (chiding the Klan for its secrecy).
198
Id. at 302, 304.
199
Pruitt, supra note 195, at 334.
200
Id. at 335 (quoting speech of Henry D. Clayton to the Florida Bar
Association, June 16, 1922).
201
Id. at 338.
202
Id.
203
278 U.S. 63 (1928).
204
Id. at 77.
205
Id. at 66.
206
Id. at 71.
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noted the “manifest tendency on the part of one class [i.e., the Klan]
to make the secrecy surrounding its purposes and membership a
cloak for acts and conduct inimical to the public welfare.”
207
The
Court also mentioned a recent Congressional Report on the Ku Klux
Klan describing its support for “white supremacy,” “its crusade
against Catholics, Jews, and negroes” and efforts to “assum[e] a sort
of guardianship over the administration of local, state, and national
affairs” by “taking into its own hands the punishment of what some
of its members conceived to be crimes.”
208
The same concerns about membership lists also extended to
masks. From the perspective of the Rev. Dr. Joseph Silverman,
Rabbi Emeritus at Temple Emanu-El, anti-mask laws and demands
for membership lists were two parts of one piece: both targeted
actions of people “aroused to the necessity of combating the un-
American and irreligious conspiracy that strikes at the very vitals of
American life, its peace and security.”
209
Mask bans were as focused
on Klan recruitment as they were on stopping Klan violence. For
instance, Sue Wilson Abbey, surveying the situation in Arizona,
viewed the proposed 1923 anti-mask law as reflecting the activities
and expansion of the Klan.
210
During the first two waves of Klan activity, mask bans served a
practical purpose—either stopping Klan night riding or preventing
the Klan from expanding.
211
The situation behind the third wave of
mask bans of the 1940s and 1950s, however, was different. While
there were instances in which Klan activity led to the passage of
mask bans (as, for instance, in Alabama where a dawn raid by forty
Klansmen on an interracial Girl Scout camp helped spur the passage
207
Id. at 75.
208
Id. at 76–77.
209
Joseph Silverman, The Ku Klux Klan: A Paradox, 223 N. AM. REV. 282,
290 (1926).
210
Abbey, supra note 196, at 21 (noting that immediately before discussing
the March 1923 proposal for an anti-mask ban, Wilson related how in Tucson the
Klan sought to recruit teenage boys).
211
See Kahn, Masks Bans, supra note 13, at 12–18.
102 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
of that state’s mask ban),
212
the general pattern, as we have seen,
213
was for states to enact mask bans to make a statement that they
hoped would convince the rest of the country that “separate but
equal” was compatible with a “civilized” progressive South.
214
For example, in South Carolina, Governor James Byrnes ran on
a platform of “equal educational opportunity” which he hoped
would enable him to cast the NAACP as extremists.
215
Yet this was
a difficult program to achieve, in part because whites objected to
spending money on African American schools,
216
and in part
because continued Klan activity risked undermining the good
impression the Governor was committed to making.
217
With these
concerns in mind, Byrnes passed an anti-Klan mask ban in South
Carolina in 1951.
218
Developments in Georgia were roughly similar.
212
See Solomon Kimerling, Unmasking the Klan: Late 1940s Coalition
Against Racial Violence, WELD: BIRMINGHAM’S NEWSPAPER (Jul. 18, 2012),
https://weldbham.com/blog/2012/07/18/unmasking-the-klan-late-1940s-
coalition-against-racial-violence/; see also Kahn, Mask Bans, supra note 13, at
21–22 (describing Alabama as an example of a “bottom-up” mask ban).
213
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
214
SeeWARD, supra note 55, at 121; see also Kahn, Mask Bans, supra note
13, at 18–23 (discussing political attempts to use the anti-mask legislation as a
means to portray the South as “tolerant” and “civilized”).
215
SeeWARD, supra note 55, at 122, 137.
216
See id. at 137. To that end, Byrnes threatened that, if desegregation
succeeded, he would shut down South Carolina’s public education system,
leaving African Americans without any educational opportunities at all. Id. at
127–28.
217
Id. at 128–30. For example, The Grand Kleagle of South Carolina
Thomas Hamilton tried to make common cause with Byrnes by arguing that both
he and Byrnes supported racial integrity and conservative principles. Id. at 130.
218
Id. at 129. Section 16-7-110 of South Carolina’s criminal statute, entitled
“Wearing masks and the like,” provides that:
No person over sixteen years of age shall appear or enter upon
any lane, walk, alley, street, road, public way or highway of this
State or upon the public property of the State or of any
municipality or county in this State while wearing a mask or
other device which conceals his identity. Nor shall any such
person demand entrance or admission to or enter upon the
premises or into the enclosure or house of any other person
while wearing a mask or device which conceals his identity.
Nor shall any such person, while wearing a mask or device
which conceals his identity, participate in any meeting or
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Georgia Governor Herman Talmadge passed an anti-mask law in
1951, a few months after South Carolina passed its law.
219
Once
again, Governor Talmadge was less concerned about defending the
rights of African Americans—to say nothing of ending Jim Crow
laws—than in making a statement that symbolically repudiated the
Klan.
220
African Americans at the time where skeptical of Governor
Talmadge’s intentions, and one columnist asked in the context of
school equalization whether the Governor had “sprouted wings and
halo.”
221
The Supreme Court of Georgia, writing thirty-nine years
later, was not so savvy; it described the circumstances of the mask
ban as being passed “in response to a demonstrated need to
safeguard the people from terrorization by masked vigilantes.”
222
Miller also described how the years leading up to the South Carolina
mask ban had seen “increased harassment, intimidation and violence
against racial and religious minorities carried out by mask-wearing
Klansmen and other ‘hate’ organizations.”
223
Finally,Miller quoted
from Judge Osgood Williams, the legislative sponsor of the 1951
mask law, justifying the ban by arguing that fear makes it harder for
people to register to vote or take part in political activities, and the
presence of fear is more likely when mask-wearing is permissible.
224
There is surely an element of truth in whatMiller says about the
Klan,
225
but in an age in which we are told that Antifa is the new
demonstration upon the private property of another unless he
shall have first obtained the written permission of the owner and
the occupant of such property.
S.C. CODEANN. § 16-7-110 (2019).
219
WARD, supra note 55, at 130–31.
220
At the time Talmadge banned the Klan, he was facing a local
desegregation suit and, following the lead of Byrnes, embarked on an “ambitious
[school] equalization campaign of his own.” Id. at 131.
221
Id. at 136. The columnist answered his own question, observing that the
Governor “was smart enough to know that unless there is compliance with U.S.
Supreme Court rulings about equalization of racial facilities, integration will
come.” Id.
222
State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550 (Ga. 1990).
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Miller also quoted a passage from Judge Williams in which, to make his
case, he referred to a March 1949 Atlanta Constitution headline that read: “Klan
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Klan, we must be cautious of the way courts like that in Miller use
the evils of the Klan to justify potentially broad mask bans. To be
clear, Miller did not quite do this. As we shall see in Part III,
226
the
Georgia Supreme Court there instead reined in the statute Governor
Talmadge enacted so that it would apply only to “mask-wearing
conduct that is intended to conceal the wearer’s identity and that the
wearer knows, or reasonably should know, gives rise to a reasonable
apprehension of intimidation, threats or impending violence.”
227
That said,Miller’s use of the Klan’s horrific acts to justify the state’s
anti-mask law raises concerns for freedom of speech and
association.
228
If the story of New York State’s mask ban is about a
nervous state overstepping its bounds, producing a ban that covers a
threat that—strictly speaking—no longer exists, the story
surrounding anti-Klan mask bans is too often about making
symbolic statements about the Klan’s nefarious role in American
history. This becomes problematic to the extent mask bans no longer
are used exclusively, or primarily, against the Klan.
229
III. THEROAD FROM SKOKIE: WHATWENTWRONG?
With an understanding of the history of mask bans, we can now
explore how over the past forty years mask law doctrine has moved
so decisively from a moment protecting mask wearers to another
justifying mask bans. The extent of the doctrinal shift is
breathtaking. In 1978, the same year the Seventh Circuit and Illinois
Parades in Wrightsville Election Eve 400 Registered Negroes Fail to Vote.” Id.
(quoting Judge Williams).
226
See infra pp. 112–17.
227
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 553. In Daniels, the Georgia Supreme Court further
narrowed the scope of the law, holding that the wearer must, in addition to
intending to conceal his identity, “either intend[] to threaten, intimidate, or
provoke the apprehension of violence, or act[] with reckless disregard for the
consequences of his conduct or a heedless indifference to the rights and safety of
others, with reasonable foresight that injury would probably result.” Daniels v.
State, 448 S.E.2d 185, 189 (Ga. 1994).
228
See Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 550–51.
229
This largely distinguishes mask wearing from cross burning which, since
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003), has been punishable when done with
the intent to intimidate. Id. Simply put, it is hard to imagine a situation in which
anyone but a Klan member would burn a cross to intimidate someone else.
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Supreme Court were wrestling with the Nazi march in Skokie, two
courts upheld the right of Iranian students to protest the Shah while
wearing masks.
230
They did so despite the potential to side with the
protection against fears like those of New York State in fighting
masked anti-renters, or the opportunity to rely on the history of
masks in countering the activities of the Ku Klux Klan. Aryan v.
Mackey and Ghafari v. Municipal Court reflect Brandenburg v.
Ohio
231
where the United States Supreme Court crafted the broad
incitement to an imminent lawless action test in a case involving the
Ku Klux Klan,
232
as well as Collin v. Smith
233
where the Seventh
Circuit spoke eloquently about how defending the right of Nazis to
march in Skokie, Illinois did not mean that the court supported
Nazism.
234
Taken together, these cases showed a trend toward courts
expressing non-endorsement of Klan-related activities and beliefs,
but issuing rulings in favor of free speech and expression.
235
The year after Skokie, Aryeh Neier wroteDefending My Enemy:
American Nazis in Skokie, Illinois, and the Risks of Freedom, a
classic work in which he, as Executive Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union during the 1970s, describes the efforts of the
ACLU in defending the freedom of speech and assembly rights of
the Klan and neo-Nazi groups.
236
This is much in keeping with the
230
Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Ghafari v. Mun.
Court for S.F. Judicial Dist., 150 Cal. Rptr. 813, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
231
395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (limiting restrictions to speech that incites to
imminent violence); Aryan, 462 F. Supp. 90; Ghafari, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813.
232
In describing the Klan meeting, the per curiam opinion went so far as to
quote a speaker who used racially explicit language. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 446 (1969).
233
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
234
Id. at 1210 (expressing “extreme regret that after several thousand years
of attempting to strengthen the often-thin coating of civilization . . . there would
still be those who resort to hatred and vilification of fellow human beings because
of their racial background or their religious beliefs”). For a comparative context,
see Robert A. Kahn, The Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Rhetoric of
Libertarian Regret, 16 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 151, 159–63, 172–77
(2009) (comparing U.S. rhetoric of libertarian regret to anti-totalitarian ethos
prevalent in Europe).
235
See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449; Collin, 578 F.2d 1197.
236
See generally ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDINGMY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS
IN SKOKIE, ILLINOIS, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979) (summarizing the
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argument, raised by ACLU director during the 1990s Nadine
Strossen, that hate speech bans are most likely to be used against
those they are intended to protect.
237
While these arguments reflect
the mainstream position of courts
238
and American legal
academics
239
with respect to First Amendment protection of hate
speech, this is not the position courts and some law reviews take
with regard to mask bans.
240
The purpose of this Part is to understand
why this is the case, or, from a civil libertarian perspective, to ask:
what went wrong?
As noted in the Introduction, there were three turning points in
mask law doctrine.
241
The first one—the failure of the State v.
Robinson overbreadth approach to “strong” mask bans to take hold
in other courts—is akin to the dog of Sherlock Holmes that did not
bark.
242
The robust defense of the Georgia mask law on anti-Klan
grounds in State v. Miller played a role in that failure for overbreadth
challenges to spread. We will discuss both cases in Section III.A.
243
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) efforts to protect the Ku Klux Klan
and neo-Nazi groups’ constitutional right).
237
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L. J. 482, 555–57 (1990).
238
See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 861–68 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (invalidating University of Michigan hate speech code as overbroad).
239
See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV 267 (1991) (opposing bans on hate speech in public
discourse); Strossen, supra note 237. For more on Post, see Robert A. Kahn,Why
Do Europeans Ban Hate Speech? A Debate Between Karl Loewenstein and
Robert Post, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545, 568–84 (2013).
240
See, e.g., Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356
F.3d 197, 205–09, (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding New York’s mask law); State v.
Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 553 (Ga. 1990) (narrowing but upholding Georgia’s mask
law); Allen, supra note 20, at 859 (defending mask bans as constitutional).
241
See supra Section I.B.
242
See infra Section III.A; The phrase emphasizes the importance of noting
absence and not only presence. It comes from Holmes’s short story “The
Adventure of Silver Blaze,” wherein a racehorse disappears, and Holmes is able
to identify the individual behind the disappearance because a normally vocal dog
at the horse’s stable did not bark on the night of the disappearance. For more, see
Maria Konnikova, Lessons from Sherlock Holmes, Pt. I, Paying Attention to What
Isn’t There, BIG THINK (July 21, 2011), https://bigthink.com/artful-
choice/lessons-from-sherlock-holmes-pti-paying-attention-to-what-isnt-there.
243
See infra Section III.A.
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Section III.B turns to State v. Berrill.
244
Berrill is an odd case. It
did not involve a Klan or a protest group at all, but rather, as we have
seen, an angry parent who “pranced” about at a school board
meeting dressed in a devil’s mask.
245
The holding for the state of
West Virginia was expected, but its rationale was not. Instead of
focusing solely on the safety concerns raised by the defendant’s
devil mask, Berrill chipped away at the symbolic speech protections
of mask wearers by giving the Spence v. Washington test real
teeth.
246
This Section asks: what led the West Virginia Supreme
Court to take this step?
Finally, Section III.C turns to the Second Circuit opinion in
Church of American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik which, as
we have seen, not only closed the door to most anonymous speech
and symbolic speech claims of mask wearers, but embarked on an
extended discussion of the history behind the passage of New
York’s anti-mask act.
247
Section III.C explores the doctrinal moves
made by the Kerik court and discusses why it chose to discuss the
history of New York’s mask ban.
248
A. Robinson, Miller and the Failed Overbreadth
Challenge to Mask Bans
In 1981, the Florida Supreme Court in Robinson voided
Florida’s mask ban as overbroad and vague.
249
The decision was
quite short—it only runs a page in the Southern Reporter.
250
Clearly,
the court did not treat the statute at issue (or Florida’s anti-mask law
as a reflection of the state’s position on the Ku Klux Klan) as
something worthy of extended discussion.
251
Instead, the court
244
State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 516 (W. Va. 1996); see infra Section
III.B.
245
Berrill, 474 S.E.2d at 510.
246
Id. at 514–16.
247
See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d
204–05, 208–10 (2d Cir. 2004).
248
See infra Section III.C.
249
Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1980).
250
See id. at 1076–77 (issuing a decision spanning approximately one page).
251
See id. (lacking an in-depth discussion of Florida’s anti-mask law).
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proceeded matter-of-factly.
252
Robinson quoted the Florida law in
full—which punished mask wearing so as “to conceal the identity of
the wearer” on public property.
253
While the defendant raised a variety of challenges based on
freedom of speech, freedom of association and equal protection, the
court did not consider these because it found that the statute was
overbroad.
254
In reaching this conclusion, the court declined to
speculate on “whether the statute [wa]s intended to apply to any core
activities which the legislature has an interest in preventing” but
instead concluded that the mask law was “susceptible of application
to entirely innocent activities.”
255
This, in turn, would “create
prohibitions that completely lack any rational basis.”
256
The court
then noted that the exceptions to the Section 876.13 mask ban
contained in Section 876.16
257
were “not sufficient to cure this fatal
overbreadth” and rejected a request by the state to provide a
“limiting instruction.”
258
At first glance, Robinson might not seem altogether unusual. In
1978, two courts had upheld the right of Iranian students to protest
the Shah while masked.
259
Indeed, in Ghafari, a state appeals court
struck down California’s mask ban as vague and overbroad.
260
What
252
Id. (providing considerably concise language to come to its conclusion).
253
Id. at 1076 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 876.13 (2019)). Florida has a series of
laws covering mask wearing. Section 876.12 prohibits mask wearing on a road or
public way; Section 876.14 penalizes entering or demanding admission to the
home of another while masked. See §§ 876.13–14. Finally, Section 876.15
prohibits masked demonstrations on the property of another without consent. See
Nicol v. State, 939 So. 2d 231, 233 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
254
Robinson, 393 So. 2d at 1077.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
The exceptions contained in the Florida law are quite similar to those in
Alabama and Georgia. See supra note 31. Section 876.16 exempts holiday
costumes, masks used for a variety of professional setting, masks worn in
theatrical productions, and gas masks used in emergency drills. FLA. STAT. §
876.16.
258
Robinson, 393 So. 2d at 1077.
259
Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Ghafari v.Mun.
Court for S.F. Judicial Dist., 150 Cal. Rptr. 813, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
260
Ghafari, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 813–19.
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distinguishes Robinson is how sparse and direct the opinion is.
261
What took the California Court of Appeals six pages to discuss, the
Florida Supreme Court handled in six paragraphs.
262
While the
opinions ofGhafari and Aryan described the circumstances in which
the mask bans were applied,
263
the Robinson court said nothing
about the underlying facts of the case. Finally, unlike Aryan or
Ghafari, which involved a university policy and California’s anti-
mask law respectively,
264
Robinson struck down a mask ban enacted
in 1951 in Florida in response to the Ku Klux Klan.
265
Most importantly, however, Robinson raises the question of
whether there might be objections to mask bans that go beyond
concerns about speech and expression.
266
Thus the opinion speaks
of “entirely innocent activities” and “prohibitions that lack any
rational basis,”
267
appealing to the classic disapproval of
discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement of criminal statutes. These
“innocent activities” and irrational “prohibitions,” moreover, fall
outside the already fairly generous exceptions encompassed in
Section 876.16.
268
Read broadly, Robinson appears to suggest that
261
Robinson, 393 So. 2d at 1076–77 (invalidating Florida’s mask ban in a
brief, vague opinion).
262
See Ghafari, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 813–19 (providing six pages to explain the
court’s decision); Robinson, 393 So. 2d at 1076–77 (explaining the court’s
decision in six paragraphs).
263
Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 91 (describing the plan of Iranian students to wear
masks at a proposed march); Ghafari, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 814 (describing how
defendant was arrested while picketing outside the Iranian Consulate in San
Francisco while covering his face with a leaflet).
264
Aryan, 492 F. Supp. at 91; Ghafari, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 814. Neither Aryan
nor Ghafari referred to the Klan; however, Ghafari did note that the participants
in the Boston Tea Party wore disguises. Ghafari, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 819 n.6.
265
See CHALMERS, supra note 182, at 340 (describing passage of the Florida
law); Swertfeger, supra note 58, at 186.
266
Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1980) (“[The statute] is
susceptible of being applied as to create prohibitions that completely lack any
rational basis . . . . [A]lthough the law is overbroad in its sweep and lacks a
rational basis, its language is very specific.”)
267
Robinson, 393 So. 2d at 1077.
268
“The exceptions provided by section 876.16, Florida Statues (1977), are
not sufficient to cure this fatal overbreadth.” Id. (citing to FLA. STAT. § 876.16
(2019)); FLA. STAT. § 876.16 (2019) (providing exemptions to those: “[(1)]
wearing traditional holiday costumes,” (2) “engaged in trades and employment,”
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the state has no business with an individual’s wearing a mask while
playing catch in a public park, even if he cannot show that his
motivation for wearing the mask was self-protection or
anonymity.
269
The rationale of Robinson and the distaste toward the
potential for discriminatory enforcement also would seem to apply
to cases of cross-dressing which were prosecuted under mask bans,
such as in People v. Archibald
270
—simply put, a man dressing as a
woman (or vice versa) is the type of activity that ought to be exempt
from a mask ban, irrespective of whether it is protected by the First
Amendment.
271
Mere months after Robinson, the Florida State Legislature
enacted Section 876.155.
272
This provision restricts liability under
Florida’s mask laws to instances in which the wearer intends to
(3) “using masks in theatrical productions,” and (4) “wearing gas masks
prescribed in emergency management drills and exercises.”)).
269
See Robinson, 393 So. 2d at 1077.
270
296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968). In Archibald, a defendant
appealed his conviction of the offense of vagrancy in the code of criminal
procedure under Section 887, subdivision 7, “impersonating a female.” Id. at 835.
The statute provided that a vagrant is an individual who “[has] his face painted,
discolored, covered or concealed, or being otherwise disguised, in a manner
calculated to prevent his being identified.” Id. The dissent explained that in setting
aside the appellant’s conviction and dismissing the complaint, the majority and
the lower court erred in their interpretation of their mask ban’s intent, noting that
the penal law at issue seeks to regulate public “congregation of persons” who are
masked. Id. at 840 (Markowitz, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). “The statute at
most attempts to regulate public group conduct and not the wearing of female
attire and use of facial makeup per se by a single male individual.” Id.
271
Dissenting in Archibald, Justice Markowitz related the history of the anti-
rent riots, conceding that some men “wore women’s calico dresses to further
conceal their identities” and that this attire “was used in furtherance of a scheme
of murder and insurrection.” Id. at 837. While Justice Markowitz took a fairly
harsh view of the anti-renters, he nevertheless made the fairly obvious point that
“males dressed in female attire for purposes other than discussed above [i.e.,
murder and insurrection] were not even considered by the Legislature [in]
adopting the section.” Id.; see also Garcia v. State, 443 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1969) (tossing conviction of a man dressed as a woman under Texas
law banning disguises because “the arresting officer testified that he had no
difficulty in identifying appellant’s face either with or without the wig and other
sartorial embellishments”).
272
The statute was enacted in 1981, presumably immediately after the
Robinson case, which was decided in 1980.
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deprive another of equal protection;
273
intends to deprive another
from exercising a right granted under federal state or local law;
274
intends to “intimidate, threaten, abuse, or harass any other
person;”
275
or uses a mask to avoid identification while engaging in
conduct “that could reasonably lead to the institution of a civil or
criminal proceeding.”
276
By adding an intent requirement to the
mask ban, the state legislature crafted a law which—while still
covering a fair amount of conduct
277
—no longer applies to someone
playing Frisbee in a public park. This protection of “innocent
activity” moreover, came without much fanfare. For instance, when
discussing a 2013 case in which a police officer was charged with
violating the mask law for wearing a V for Vendetta mask, the head
of the Broward County Public Defender’s office described the
Florida mask laws as “intended to stop the KKK and bank robbers—
not peaceful protesters.”
278
Taken as a whole, Robinsonwas a positive development in mask
law doctrine. Through a combination of judicial and legislative
action, a “strong” (strict liability) mask ban was replaced with a
“weak” (intent-based and narrowly targeted) one. Moreover, this
series of events occurred in a southern state that passed its mask law
in response to the Klan. Given all of this, why didn’t Robinson
become a model for mask bans nationwide? The answer to this
question turns on Miller, a case that, like Robinson, led to the
narrowing of a state anti-mask law
279
but did so in a way that sent a
powerful anti-Klan message which, over time, would lead mask law
273
FLA. STAT. § 876.155(1) (2019).
274
§ 876.155(2).
275
§ 876.155(3).
276
§ 876.155(4).
277
For example, a Florida Court briefly cited Section 876.55 to make the
point that the police likely had reasonable suspicion to stop masked men furtively
walking outside a 7-Eleven in the early morning hours. Nicol v. State, 939 So. 2d
231, 233 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
278
See Lisa J. Huriash, Arrest of South Florida Officer Brings Attention to
Anti-Mask Law, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.sun-
sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2013-12-10-fl-cop-protest-mask-anonymous-
20131203-story.html. Huriash notes that mask arrests have been rare in South
Florida, and less than half the arrests were actually prosecuted. Id.
279
Compare State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 547 (Ga. 1990), with Robinson
v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1981).
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doctrine away from its civil libertarian heyday of the 1970s and
1980s.
On one level, the reason for Miller’s anti-Klan message is easy
to understand. Unlike the unspecified mask-wearer at issue in
Robinson, Miller featured a defendant who appeared in public
wearing a Klan mask and hood.
280
As we have seen, the Miller
majority responded to this fact by writing about the passage of
Georgia’s anti-Klan act at length, with an emphasis on the Klan’s
crimes of “violence and intimidation,” including “beatings and
lynchings.”
281
By arguing that the “interests furthered by the Anti-
Mask Act lie at the very heart of the realm of legitimate
governmental activity,”
282
the opinion sent the message that the
Supreme Court of Georgia recognized the evils of the Klan.
On the other hand, the actual holding of Miller was not that
different from what the Robinson court and state legislature
collectively came up with in Florida.
283
In response to the Miller
defendant’s argument that the anti-mask law was overbroad and
“criminalize[d] a substantial amount of innocent behavior, such as
wearing a ski-mask in mid-winter, wearing sunglasses on a sunny
day, or wearing a mask to make a political point,”
284
the majority
referred to a Statement of Public Policy enacted in 1951,
285
which
highlighted equal protection of the laws, protection against
intimidation and physical violence, and threats.
286
Given this
purpose, the anti-mask law was “easily susceptible to a narrowing
construction,” which the court then provided.
287
In light of the
official public policy statement, the Georgia mask ban would be
interpreted narrowly to apply only where a defendant intended to
conceal his or her identity and did so knowing that “the conduct
provokes reasonable apprehension of intimidation, threats or
violence.”
288
280
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 549.
281
Id. at 550.
282
Id. at 551.
283
Compare id. at 553, with Robinson, 393 So. 2d at 1077.
284
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 551.
285
Id. at 549 (citing GA. L. 1951, p. 9 §1).
286
Id.
287
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 552.
288
Id. at 552–53 (restating the test in slightly different language).
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Had this been the full extent of the Miller case, it may not have
had that great an impact in the development of mask doctrine. What
made the case more noteworthy was an impassioned dissent by
Presiding Justice Smith, who argued that “the true legislative intent
[behind the anti-mask law] was to unmask a dissident group.”
289
Justice Smith noted that, according to Judge Osgood Williams, the
same person who drafted the statute and then sat as a superior court
judge for twenty years, “not one person who committed an armed
robbery . . . was charged under the anti-mask statute.”
290
Justice
Smith also quoted Judge Williams’s view that “probably a goodly
number of Klansmen . . . are nonviolent” and fear identification, in
part because, given the “open society that we have and the news
media we have, it’s become tremendously unpopular to be a member
of the Ku Klux Klan.”
291
According to the dissent, “[t]he Klan’s white robes, hats, and
masks may all express the idea of a threat, but ideas are
protected.”
292
To that end, Justice Smith described how, in October
1990, he met with 200 high school students and noted with relish
that, after discussing Brandenburg and Collin, the students agreed
by an “overwhelming majority” that freedom of speech should
include “the right of Nazi and other radical groups to advocate
political ideas that are contrary to society’s basic beliefs and
offensive to large [groups of people].”
293
The debate between the majority and the dissent over the
meaning of the Klan obscured doctrinal areas of agreement.
294
Chief
Justice Clarke, writing for the majority, acknowledged the
possibility of bringing an NAACP v. Alabama anonymity claim but
found no evidence of injury or job loss.
295
For his part, Presiding
289
Id. at 554 (Smith, P.J., dissenting).
290
Id. at 554–55 (Smith, P.J., dissenting).
291
Id. at 554 n.8 (quoting Judge Osgood Williams). To that end, Justice
Smith added that defendant, who was the only person in Klan regalia, feared that
“his identification as a Klan member could create danger for himself and his
family.” Id. at 555 (Smith, P.J., dissenting).
292
Id. at 557 (Smith, P.J., dissenting).
293
Id. 557 n.13 (Smith, P.J., dissenting).
294
See Allen, supra note 20, at 842–43.
295
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 553.
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Justice Smith agreed with a concurring opinion by Justice Hunt
296
which called for requiring that the defendant have “actual intent” to
intimidate, rather than the reasonable apprehension standard favored
by the majority
297
—a statement showing the dissent’s willingness to
support some version of an anti-mask law.
298
Justices Clarke and Smith’s disagreement was not over the mask
ban, but over the Klan and its role in Georgia.
299
This, in turn,
spawned a series of law review articles that, faced with choosing
between opposing mask laws and repudiating the Klan, generally
chose the latter.
300
For example, Wayne Allen, writing in the
University of Georgia Law Review, noted that while some “civil
libertarians” supported the defendant in Miller, “prosecutors and
civil rights groups” hailed the ruling.
301
Investigating the “vitality
and validity” of mask bans, Allen focused on their role in curbing
“the violent activities of the various orders of the Ku Klux Klan.”
302
To that end, he described the wave of mask bans in the 1940s and
1950s as a response to “[t]erroristic acts by masked Klansmen.”
303
At the same time, he faulted Miller for protecting too much
behavior—all a state should need to show is an intent to conceal
one’s identity.
304
In justifying this position, Allen argued that masks “enable
criminals to commit terroristic, violent and deadly acts with
impunity.”
305
This reality, determined by legislatures “based on
historical evidence”—presumably the Klan experience—means that
“intentionally concealing [one’s] identity in public places is conduct
296
Id. at 553–54 (Hunt, J., concurring).
297
Id. at 556 (Smith, P.J., dissenting).
298
Three years later, the court shifted the intent standard to “reckless
disregard”—a nod in Justice Smith’s direction. See Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d
185, 189 (Ga. 1994).
299
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 547, 554 (majority opinion and Smith, P.J.,
dissenting).
300
See Allen, supra note 20; see, e.g., Stephen J. Simoni, “Who Goes
There?” – Proposing a Model Anti-Mask Act, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 241 (1992).
301
Allen, supra note 20, at 820.
302
Id. at 820–21.
303
Id. at 827.
304
Id. at 858.
305
Id. at 859.
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which generally poses a risk or danger to others that society is not
willing to tolerate.”
306
To that end, Allen took issue with Aryan and
Ghafari on doctrinal grounds
307
but made no distinction between the
threat posed by a group of masked Klan members and other, less
violent mask wearers. Instead, Allen laid the masked terror of the
Klan on the shoulders of the Iranian students protesting the Shah.
308
Steven J. Simoni, proposing a model anti-mask law in the
Fordham Law Review a year later, took what initially looks like a
more nuanced view, faulting theMiller majority for minimizing the
evidence of harassment
309
and suggesting that “the court rendered
the ruling that it did for political reasons.”
310
Indeed, he expressed
concern that Miller had engaged in “ideology based judicial
reasoning,” especially given that the lower court had upheld the
defendant’s right to wear a mask.
311
At the same time, however,
Simoni proposed a model mask ban that punished mask wearing
when done “with intent to conceal [one’s] physical identity.”
312
Simoni defended his proposed mask law as “an effective
prophylactic crime-fighting device”
313
without explaining why
either the mask ban or his chosen intent standard was necessary.
In the end,Miller and the debate that followed changed the tone
of the discussion over mask bans. The focus shifted away from a
concern that mask laws would reach “innocent activity” to concerns
about the Klan, terrorism and judge made politics. It is difficult to
avoid laying some blame at the feet of Presiding Justice Smith. As
306
Id.
307
Id. at 851, 55–56 (criticizing Aryan and Ghafari).
308
For instance, just before describing Aryan, Allen describes how banning
masks “aids the apprehension of criminals and discourages the commission of
violent crimes.” Id. at 851. While this might apply to Klan activity, it seems an
odd way to characterize the anti-Shah protesters in Aryan. See Aryan v. Mackey,
462 F. Supp. 90, 91 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (describing the students’ request “to hold a
peaceful demonstration”).
309
Simoni, supra note 300, at 264–65 n.157.
310
Id. at 264–65 n.157.
311
Id. at 266 n.163.
312
Id. at 268, 272. While the mask law is subject to a lengthy list of
exceptions, including one for First Amendment activity, the exception depends on
the discretion of the police in determining whether mask wearers are engaged in
activity protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 272.
313
Id. at 273.
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Ronald Dworkin once put it, liberty involves making sacrifices that
really hurt.
314
In the context of protecting the First Amendment
rights of hate speakers, this means more than simply acknowledging
that the group in question is unpopular,
315
discussing First
Amendment cases with high school students,
316
or stating—as the
lower court did in Miller—that Klan members in Georgia were as
threatened as the Iranians in Ghafari or African Americans in
NAACP.
317
Had Justice Smith felt compelled, as Circuit Judge Pell
had been in Collin, to “express [his] repugnance at the doctrines
which the appellees desire[d] to profess publicly,”
318
perhaps Chief
Justice Clarke would have tempered his own anti-Klan rhetoric and
the move of mask law doctrine toward greater restriction would have
unfolded more slowly.
B. Berrill and the Vanishing Message of the Mask
While on a cultural planeMiller departed considerably from Lee
Bollinger’s tolerant society model encapsulated by the Skokie affair
which protects even the speech of hateful racists in the name
promoting societal tolerance,
319
Miller’s practical impact was
unclear. Instead of banning all mask wearing, save for a few
exceptions,Miller required intent,
320
a standard which held out some
hope that the “innocent activities” identified by Robinsonmight still
be protected.
321
Both the promise and limits of the Miller approach
in protecting ordinary, day-to-day mask wearing were on display in
Daniels v. State.
322
On the one hand, the Georgia Supreme Court in
Daniels held that a middle-aged African American man who wore a
mask to play with neighborhood children may have known that his
314
Ronald Dworkin, The Unbearable Cost of Liberty, in 3 INDEX ON
CENSORSHIP 43, 46 (1995).
315
State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 555 (Ga. 1990) (Smith, P.J., dissenting).
316
Id. at 557 n.13.
317
State v. Miller, No. 90D-929-2, slip. Op. (Ga. Super. Ct. May, 25, 1990)
rev’d on other grounds, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990).
318
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978).
319
BOLLINGER, supra note 2; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
320
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 553.
321
Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1980).
322
448 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1994).
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behavior ran the risk of scaring them, but he did not act with
“reckless disregard” or “heedless indifference” as to the
consequences of his actions, especially since his intent was to
“entertain the children.”
323
Moreover, the court reached this opinion
in a case where the defendant did not wear a mask to protect his
anonymity or to make a symbolic statement, aside from being
funny.
324
At the same time, some aspects of Daniels are troubling from a
civil liberties perspective. The case only made it to court because a
police officer saw the masked defendant while patrolling in his
squad car.
325
The arrest turned on the officer’s subjective opinion
that one of the girls privy to the interaction, who had turned back to
look at the defendant and officer, “appeared to be uneasy.”
326
Moreover, the Georgia Court of Appeals, which upheld the
charges,
327
took a broader view of intent. The court conceded that
even if that defendant’s “motive may have been to have fun,” this
did “not remove or exclude the offensive intent or manner of
achieving the pleasure,” particularly in a case of “[a] man following
ten or twelve-year-old girls.”
328
The defendant’s conviction for
violating the Anti-Mask Act
329
was reversed when the Georgia
Supreme Court found that the defendant was only trying to
“playfully ‘scare’” and not frighten or intimidate the children; that
his actions were similar to those of a person on Halloween, and such
actions are exempted from those covered by the Act; and that the
defendant did not act with the ‘“reckless disregard of consequences’
or ‘heedless indifference to the rights and safety of’ the children
323
Id. at 186, 189.
324
See Daniels, 448 S.E.2d at 189 (“[W]e find the evidence insufficient to
show that Daniels acted with the reckless disregard of consequences or the
heedless indifference to the rights and safety of the children in this case necessary
for conviction.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). See generally id.
(failing to address the issue of symbolic speech or anonymity).
325
Id. at 186.
326
Id.
327
Daniels v. State, 438 S.E.2d 99, 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993), rev’d, 448
SE.2d 185 (Ga. 1994).
328
Id.
329
GA. CODEANN. § 16-11-38 (West 2019).
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necessary to sustain a conviction.”
330
While his conviction was
overturned, Mr. Daniels was put through an arguably absurd series
of proceedings for what seems like innocent conduct.
While intent standards can be read narrowly in the spirit of lenity
to protect mask wearers, the ruling in the Georgia Court of Appeals
reminds that this does not always happen. Moreover, the intent
requirements established in Georgia and Florida were not emulated
elsewhere. Given this reality, the intent standard—potentially a
great way to protect “innocent” mask wearing—has not risen up to
its potential. This makes the question of First Amendment
arguments, be they based on symbolic speech or anonymity, all the
more important. In the mid-1990s there were still some grounds for
hope. While Miller ruled against the symbolic speech and
anonymity claims of the Klansman before the court, it did not do so
in a doctrinally definitive way.
331
This would change in 1996 with Berrill,
332
which narrowed the
scope for symbolic speech claims. To understand Berrill’s
impact,
333
consider the basic structure of First Amendment symbolic
speech claims. First, the party seeking First Amendment protection
must show that the activity in question is expressive in nature—i.e.
that “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and
in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.”
334
Second,
if the speech or act is expressive, a court will apply the four part test
from United States v. O’Brien.
335
Under O’Brien, a restriction on
symbolic speech is justified if:
330
Daniels, 448 S.E.2d at 185–89.
331
Instead, it rejected the evidence of harassment as insufficient to justify
mask wearing while conceding, for argument’s sake, that the mask satisfied the
Spence test. See State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550, 553 (Ga. 1990).
332
State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1996).
333
Id. at 515 (upholding the application of West Virginia’s mask ban to the
wearer of a devil mask).
334
Id. at 516 (quoting Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410–11
(1974)).
335
391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that the Universal Military Training and
Service Act prohibiting the burning of a draft card does not violate the First
Amendment).
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[i)] it is within constitutional power of the
Government; [ii)] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [iii)] if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and [iv)] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
336
Symbolic speech claims naturally raise the theme of a balancing of
interests. How does the threat posed by a mask-wearing protester
compare to the governmental interest in maintaining order and
security? This question is encapsulated in the O’Brien test, the test
most early mask cases relied on, regardless of their outcomes.
337
From the mask wearer’s perspective, the test has the benefit of
forcing the state to justify why a given mask ban is necessary. It
reflects the reality that, while state restrictions on mask wearing are
sometimes related to important security concerns (a perspective that
is one way of looking at New York’s 1845 mask ban),
338
they
sometimes are not.
Of course, the O’Brien test only comes into play if the mask
wearer satisfies the Spence v. Washington expressive conduct test—
otherwise there is no constitutional claim available aside from
overbreadth.
339
In early mask cases, however, the Spence test was a
fairly low hurdle to overcome. Aryan did not mention Spence at all,
336
Id. at 377. As we shall see, Berrill did not discuss the O’Brien elements
in depth because it did not find that the devil mask was expressive. Berrill, 474
S.E.2d at 514–15.
337
See, e.g., Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 93–94 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(applying the O’Brien test to uphold the right of Iranian students to wear masks
while protesting on campus); cf. Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1076–77
(Fla. 1980) (not reaching the O’Brien test because the court found the subject
mask law overbroad). But see State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550–51 (Ga. 1990)
(applying the test to uphold the right of the state to prevent a Klan member from
appearing in public while wearing his mask).
338
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4) (McKinney 2019).
339
Berrill, 474 S.E.2d at 516.
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while Miller conceded the issue for purposes of argument.
340
This
was not the approach taken by the court in Berrill.
341
Instead the West Virginia Supreme Court in Berrill began its
opinion by quoting from the statute which prohibits mask wearing
when “any portion of the face is so covered as to conceal the identity
of the wearer.”
342
Describing the governmental interest supported
by the statute, the court quoted at length fromMiller’s discussion of
the Klan, although it did not mention the Klan by name.
343
Berrill
added that “it does not matter what message, if any, is to be
conveyed by wearing a mask.”
344
While this language was likely
intended to defend the West Virginia statute against charges of
content discrimination, it also carried the message that, although
Miller involved the Klan and the Berrill defendant dressed as the
devil to oppose a high school mascot, the logic behindMiller would
still apply.
The West Virginia Supreme Court then applied theO’Brien test,
noting that attendees of the school board meeting “were frightened
byMr. Berrill’s behavior” and were concerned “for their own safety,
as well as the safety of the children present.”
345
As it was concluding
its analysis, the court added that it rejected the defendant’s First
Amendment claim “for an additional, persuasive reason”—namely
that the defendant failed to show that he intended to convey a
particularized message his audience was likely to understand.
346
To appreciate the novelty of Berrill’s approach, consider the
court’s own description of the defendant’s expressive purpose. In
the court’s view, Mr. Berrill “sought to convey his concern about
the use by a high school of a devil image as the school mascot and
to persuade the school to employ another mascot image.”
347
Indeed,
340
See Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 550 n.2; Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 90.
341
See Berrill, 474 S.E.2d at 516 (W. Va. 1996) (applying the Spence test to
determine whether the defendant’s “intended message was completely
misunderstood” by the board).
342
Id. at 514 (quoting W VA. CODE § 61-6-22 (2019)) (internal quotations
omitted).
343
Id. (quotingMiller, 398 S.E.2d at 551).
344
Id. at 514–15.
345
Id.
346
Id. at 515–16.
347
Id. at 516.
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he had written a series of letters to school board members, as well
as an unpublished letter to the editor to a local newspaper on the
subject. To the defendant, the devil mask was “a critical part of his
message . . . to graphically portray the image he felt the [devil]
mascot represented.”
348
In particular, “the mask was intended to
conjure the horrific image of the master of hell, as distinguished
from the almost cherubic aspect of the actual mascot.”
349
Faced with this evidence, the West Virginia Supreme Court
conceded that the defendant “may have demonstrated an intent to
convey a particularized message” but concluded that any such
message Mr. Berrill may have conveyed was “completely
misunderstood.”
350
In reaching this conclusion, the Berrill court
noted that the defendant spoke before his turn, “pranced” around the
meeting room (which had only one exit), and scared the attendees,
who included children.
351
Given these circumstances, defendant’s
“conduct”—which presumably included the mask wearing—“was
more likely to create confusion than convey an understandable
message.”
352
In effect, Berrill reduced the expressive content of the
defendant’s mask to the fear that it produced. While the United
States Supreme Court stated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that
the punishment of certain classes of speech including “fighting
words” does not present a “constitutional problem,”
353
the Court did
not go so far as to claim that such words did not contain an
expressive message.
354
Moreover, to the extent the Spence test
incorporates an objective element, the evidence is fairly strong that
the school board attendees were aware that the defendant was upset
348
Id.
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
Id.
352
Id.
353
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
354
To the contrary, the Court placed such words outside the First
Amendment ambit precisely because of the likelihood others would understand
the expressive intent of the speaker, noting that “[s]uch words, as ordinary men
know, are likely to cause a fight.” Id. at 573.
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about the school mascot and knew he was wearing a devil’s mask to
make his point.
355
In Berrill’s defense, the conduct by the defendant—speaking
before his turn and prancing around the meeting room—make the
ultimate decision to uphold the mask ban understandable,
356
and
surely any future defendant accused of violating a state mask law in
a similar setting, without terrifying his audience, would do well to
distinguish Berrill on its facts. And, fortunately for mask ban
opponents, Berrill has had relatively little traction so far. It was not
cited in Kerik, and (unlikeMiller) it was not cited by any other mask
law case. That said, Berrillmarked an important doctrinal step away
from the protection of mask wearing in the 1970s and 1980s. The
Berrill opinion could have decided the case entirely under the
O’Brien test, as the Georgia Supreme Court had in Miller, but this
was not the path taken by the West Virginia Supreme Court.
Instead, Berrill opened the door to the argument that all
threatening mask wearing is per se non-expressive.
357
To see the
danger inherent to this approach, consider what would have
happened had the middle-aged mask-wearing defendant in
Daniels
358
been tried in a state that had a “strong” mask law—one
that bans all mask wearing. The defendant would most likely have
had to argue that, when he donned his mask, he had an expressive
purpose of entertaining the neighborhood children. Under Berrill,
the state would be able to counter this argument by showing that one
of the children found his mask threatening.
359
If the threat was
serious enough, the case would be over. To put it another way,
Berrill leaves a cause of action to mask wearers—but only well-
behaved ones.
355
At least, this is all we can surmise from the evidence presented by the
court. Also, Mr. Berrill’s task would become easier to the extent the requirement
in Spence is not that the audience understand the “exact” message the speaker
intended, but that they would interpret the message in a “similar” fashion. See
Housley, supra note 37, at 672 (arguing for a “similar message” standard).
356
See Berrill, 474 S.E.2d at 516.
357
See id. (arguing that Mr. Berrill’s message in wearing his mask was not
understood by his intended audience).
358
Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. 1994).
359
Berrill, 474 S.E.2d at 516 (describing the threat Mr. Berrill’s mask posed
to children).
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C. Kerik—Banishing Masks as a Matter of Law
As noted above, Berrill has not gained much traction,
360
and in
the late 1990s, the First Amendment protection of mask wearing saw
something of a revival before the bottom fell out with the 2004
Second Circuit opinion in Kerik.
361
For example, in the 1999 case
American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen,
362
a district
court in Indiana used the anonymous speech principle from
NAACP
363
to uphold the right of the American Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan to march masked.
364
While the New York Court of
Appeals upheld a mask ban prosecution in People v. Aboaf in
2001,
365
the next year Judge Baer of the Southern District of New
York defended the right of masked Klan members to march in New
York City.
366
By 2003, there was a pair of recent cases
367
—and
several older ones
368
—that seemed to hold hope for mask wearers.
This opening was slammed shut when in 2004 the Second
Circuit inKerik reversed Judge Baer’s decision in the lower court.
369
As we have seen, Kerik did not simply expand on Berrill by arguing
that the Klan mask does not convey a message not already conveyed
360
See supra Section III.B.
361
See generally Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik,
356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding New York’s anti-mask law and finding
such did not invoke any First Amendment rights).
362
50 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
363
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1957).
364
Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835,
840 (N.D. Ind. 1999). In reaching this conclusion, Goshen relied not only on
Aryan andGhafari but also on evidence that the Klan members faced harassment.
Id. at 840–41.
365
People v. Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2001) (disagreeing
with defendant’s challenge to New York’s mask ban as facially overbroad).
366
Church of Am. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 232 F. Supp. 2d 205
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
367
Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 845; Kerik 232 F. Supp. 2d at 216–17.
368
See, e.g., Aryan v.Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Ghafari
v. Mun. Court for S.F. Judicial Dist. S.F., 150 Cal. Rptr. 813, 819 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978).
369
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
211 (2d Cir. 2004).
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by the robe and hood
370
—a problematic holding for anyone wearing
a mask as part of a larger costume. It also held that the NAACP
theory of anonymous speech does not apply to masks.
371
The Second
Circuit’s discussion in Kerik anchored its holding to a historical
account of the origins of New York’s mask act which, as we have
seen, tended to exaggerate the threat posed by the anti-renter
movement to the state.
372
What accounts for the narrow rulings and
history lesson?
The doctrinal discussion in Kerik is not particularly rich,
especially on the subject of symbolic speech. Instead, the Second
Circuit spent several paragraphs repeating the idea “that the mask
does not communicate any message that the robe and hood do
not.”
373
After quoting Klan members, who conceded that the mask
and hood contain “no message” beyond identifying one as a Klan
member, the court stated that “the mask adds no expressive force to
the message portrayed by the rest of the outfit.”
374
So that there
would be no misunderstanding, the court added that a witness to the
proposed rally “would not . . . be more likely to understand that
association [with the Klan] if the demonstrators were also wearing
masks.”
375
While “mindful” of the difficult task of analyzing “the
expressive quality of conduct,” the court concluded that the First
Amendment is not implicated by elements of a uniform that “ha[ve]
no independent or incremental expressive value.”
376
Nor was the anonymous speech discussion much more detailed.
To be sure, Kerik described a series of Supreme Court precedents—
from NAACP
377
to Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
370
Id. at 205–08.
371
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 209.
372
See supra Section II.A.
373
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 206.
374
Id.
375
Id. at 206–07.
376
Id. at 207–08.
377
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1957).
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Foundation
378
—noting that none involved masks.
379
It made the
pithy weight of authority argument, quoted in the Introduction,
380
that neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts have previously
applied the NAACP test to masks.
381
However, Kerik failed to cite
Aryan and Goshen, both of which discussed the NAACP test in the
context of masks,
382
and it said very little about why unmasking is
different from the compelled disclosure of names. Instead, Kerik
spoke in generalities about how the First Amendment was not
implicated “every time a law makes someone—including a member
of a politically unpopular group—less willing to exercise his or her
free speech rights.”
383
To the extent Kerik offered anything of substance, it rested on
security concerns. The First Amendment “does not guarantee ideal
conditions” for communicating viewpoints because an “individual’s
right to speech must always be balanced against the state’s interest
in safety, and its right to regulate conduct that it considers
potentially dangerous.”
384
Kerik, however, never described the
specific security risk posed by the Klan members who, in 1999,
petitioned for the right to protest while wearing their masks in
downtown New York.
385
In this regard, Kerik marked a step along the path blazed by
Berrill, which implied that threatening mask wearing cannot have
an expressive purpose because it scares people.
386
But at least the
West Virginia Supreme Court there relied on an argument that was
378
525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999) (finding that requiring identification badges for
persons circulating petitions for ballot initiatives violates the First Amendment).
See generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)
(reviewing a ban on distributing anonymous campaign literature); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (reviewing a compelled disclosure issue); Talley v. Cal.,
362 U.S. 60 (1960) (involving the distribution of handbills); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (concerning distribution of names to tax officials).
379
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 208–09.
380
See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
381
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 209.
382
Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835,
840 (N.D. Ind. 1999); Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
383
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 209.
384
Id.
385
Id. at 201–02.
386
State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 516 (W. Va. 1996).
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factually specific (i.e., not all mask wearing is threatening). In using
security concerns to cabin off the NAACP argument to mask
wearers, Kerik took the a priori position that mask wearing, in all
instances, falls outside the ambit of the First Amendment. In this
regard, the Second Circuit followed Wayne Allen who, writing in
the aftermath ofMiller, argued that because masks “enable criminals
to commit terroristic, violent, and deadly acts,” legislatures were
justified, “based on historical evidence,” in exempting all mask
wearers—Klan or not—from the First Amendment protections of
speech and assembly.
387
The Second Circuit’s history lesson, however, provides some
insight into Kerik’s motives. As noted in Part II,
388
Kerik relied on
Reeve Huston’s book Land and Freedom, which offers a generally
sympathetic account of the anti-renter movement (as well as of the
masked “Indians”), to paint a picture of threat. From the Second
Circuit’s accounting, “armed insurrections” are thwarted by the
mask ban,
389
as are the “intimidation” and “tarring and feathering”
that resulted in three deaths.
390
To be sure, a similar lesson was
offered before by a dissenting Justice in Archibald,
391
which
described the Renters’ War as involving “insurrection” and
“murder” to make the broader point that a law enacted for these
purposes should not extend to prosecuting a man dressed as a
woman.
392
By contrast, Kerik used the 1845 “insurrections” to
insulate the anti-mask law from all challenges, including those of
men who dress as women (and vice versa).
On the whole, Kerik’s anti-mask stridency is hard to understand.
Let me suggest two possibilities to untangling its intricacies. First,
one possible key to unravelling this mystery reveals itself in the
post-9/11 context. In the aftermath of the 2001 attacks on the Twin
Towers, tensions were running high, and security concerns were
paramount. One sees this with cases interpreting New York’s
incitement to riot law, which punishes urging a group of ten or more
387
HUSTON, supra note 106; see supra Section II.A.
388
See supra Section II.A.
389
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 203.
390
Id. at 204.
391
People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968)
(Markowitz, J., dissenting).
392
Id.
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people to “engage in tumultuous or violent conduct of a kind likely
to create public alarm.”
393
Before 9/11, NewYork courts took a fact-
specific and sometimes stingy approach to riot incitement cases.
For example, in the 1987 case People v. Mighty,
394
the city court
of Rochester threw out charges against organizers of a house party
broken up by the police even though the host asked his guests to
remain in place and “treated the officers to a barrage of abusive
language, name calling and accusations of racism.”
395
The court
exerted leniency because the host had not urged his guests “to carry
the message of defiance into the streets.”
396
On the other hand, in
1994 case People v. Tolia,
397
the Appellate Division of New York
upheld charges of inciting a riot against organizers of a concert in
Tompkins Square Park after police tried to enforce the terms of the
group’s permit, which forbade the use of amplifiers after 9:00
PM.
398
The court upheld the charges, noting that at the moment of
the arrests, the “highly agitated” crowd had already thrown a bottle
at the police and was surging forward.
399
Despite this, concert
organizers continued to call on the crowd to “resist.”
400
Taken
together, Mighty and Tolia show that courts analyze charges of riot
incitement in a fact-specific manner,
401
the way one would hope a
court would analyze violations of mask bans.
People v. Upshaw,
402
decided in 2002, was rather different.
Upshaw involved a group of five speakers who, standing in Times
Square shortly after 9/11, told the crowd that it was “good that the
World Trade Center was bombed,” that “more cops and firemen
should have died” and that “more bombs should have been dropped
393
N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 240.08 (2019). Because the incitement law is read in
light of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969), the state must also show
that the defendant intended to create a “clear and present danger” of public alarm.
People v. Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d 632, 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
394
535 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Cty. Ct. Rochester 1987).
395
Id. at 945.
396
Id. at 946.
397
Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
398
Id. at 635–37
399
Id. at 636.
400
Id. at 633–35.
401
See supra notes 395–401 and accompanying text.
402
741 N.Y.S. 2d 664 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2002).
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and more people should have died.”
403
They warned the crowd of
approximately fifty people, “We’ve got something for your
asses.”
404
While the speakers occasionally approached crowd
members and yelled in their faces, and arguments ensued between
speakers and crowd members,
405
there was no violence or calls upon
the crowd to resist police orders once law enforcement intervened—
even though the speakers themselves did not obey police requests to
stop.
406
Upholding the charges, the court noted that the speeches came
“only days after one of the greatest catastrophes this nation has
suffered,” a time when “many New Yorkers were still grieving for
the loss of loved ones”
407
and “all Americans[] held their collective
breath at what, at the time, appeared to be the likelihood, if not the
inevitability, of additional terrorist attacks.”
408
Under these
circumstances, the statements were more than simply “a vile and
morally reprehensible diatribe[;]” they were an attempt to incite the
crowd, especially since they were made at “point blank range.”
409
In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that “[t]he talismanic
phrase ‘freedom of speech’ does not cloak all utterances in
legality.”
410
Was something similar going on in Kerik? While the Second
Circuit did not mention the attack on theWorld Trade Center, it used
similar language to that of Upshaw in arguing that, because of “the
state’s interest in safety,” the First Amendment does not “guarantee
ideal conditions” for expression.
411
Later, when describing why the
1845 law was facially valid,
412
the Kerik opinion expressed that it
was not the court’s place “to second-guess the New York
403
Id. at 667.
404
Id.
405
Id.
406
Id.
407
Id. at 668.
408
Id.
409
Id.
410
Id.
411
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
209 (2d Cir. 2004).
412
The Second Circuit was explaining why the exception for masks worn for
entertainment purposes did not invalidate the statute. Id. at 210.
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legislature’s determination during the Anti-Rent era that mask
wearing by groups poses a threat to the peace, undermining the
efforts of law enforcement officers to identify wrongdoers and thus
protect the public.”
413
Reading Kerik today, almost twenty years
after 9/11, perhaps the court was projecting its understanding of
trauma from the terror attacks and the accompanying heightened
security concerns onto an earlier time.
414
Second, Kerik may have been influenced by developments in
United States Supreme Court case law involving cross burning. In
the 1992 R.A.V. v. St. Paul case,
415
the Court held that an ordinance
prohibiting the “place[ment] on public or private property a symbol,
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not
limited to, a burning cross . . . which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” was unconstitutional
because it violated the First Amendment prohibition on content
discrimination.
416
At the time, R.A.V.was seen as proof of American
free speech “absolutism”—freedom of speech provided even to the
benefit of the Ku Klux Klan.
417
Some commentators welcomed this
change; others did not.
418
Either way, for a decade there was serious
doubt as to whether the state could punish cross burning at all.
419
413
Id.
414
The 9/11 context helps explain the length of the Kerik court’s discussion
of the Renters’ War as well as how the court used Huston’s largely sympathetic
account of the masked tenant farmers of the Hudson Valley to present a picture of
an “armed insurrection.” Kerik, 356 F.3d at 203–05; see also HUSTON, supra note
106, at 217 (describing how the anti-rent movement ushered in a “new, triumphant
ideology of ‘free labor’”).
415
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
416
Id. at 380, 391 (quoting St. Paul, Minnesota, Bias–Motivated Crime
Ordinance).
417
See Kahn, Cross-Burning, supra note 70, at 164, 171.
418
For instance, Samuel Walker viewed R.A.V. as a triumph for civil
liberties. See WALKER, supra note 2, at 158, while Owen Fiss thought that the
Court overlooked the reality that sometimes courts had to “curtail speech” to
allow “the less powerful to be heard.” OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THEMANYUSES OF STATE POWER 111 (1996).
419
Neither the supporters nor the critics of R.A.V. noted the partial nature of
the ruling. It struck down St. Paul’s cross burning statute on content
discrimination grounds and left open the possibility of a content neutral law that
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This changed in 2003 with Virginia v. Black, wherein the Court
allowed states to prosecute cross burning when done with an intent
to intimidate.
420
In addition to reversing the impression created by
R.A.V. that the First Amendment left states powerless to combat the
Klan, the question of whether cross burning by its very nature
intimidates others led to an extended colloquy between Justices
O’Connor and Thomas over the meaning of cross burning in
American history.
421
While Justice O’Connor, in the interests of
justifying her “intent to intimidate” standard, provided instances of
cross burning done without an apparent intimidatory intent (such as
a cross burned at a 1939 wedding between a Nazi party member and
a Klansman),
422
Justice Thomas argued that cross-burning has
“almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably instills in
its victims well-founded fear of physical violence.”
423
The shift from R.A.V. to Virginiawas quite dramatic. In the span
of eleven years, the Court went from questioning whether the state
could punish cross burning in any capacity
424
to whether the state
could punish all cross burning—even when done for “innocent”
reasons (although Justice Thomas would dispute this
characterization).
425
Is it possible this shift, and the excitement it
might pass constitutional muster. See Kahn, Cross-Burning, supra note 70, at
172–73. That this conversation could take place without consideration of State v.
Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990), in which the Georgia Supreme Court upheld
a content neutral mask ban enacted with the motive of opposing the Klan, shows
the extent of the disconnect between debate over hate speech in the 1990s and the
increasing protection for mask bans taking place at the same time.
420
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 347, 363 (2004).
421
Justice O’Connor expressed her views as the author of the majority
opinion, id. at 347–68, while Justice Thomas expressed his views in dissent, id. at
388–401 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For more, see Kahn,Cross-Burning, supra note
70, at 177–81; Robert A. Kahn, Did the Burning Cross Speak? Virginia v. Black
and the Debate Between Justices O’Connor and Thomas over the History of Cross
Burning, 39 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y, 75, 75–90 (Austin Sarat ed. 2006).
422
Black, 538 U.S. at 356–57.
423
Id. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In reaching the conclusion that cross
burning is not expressive, Justice Thomas argued that “[i]t strains credulity to
suggest that a state legislature that adopted a litany of segregationist laws self-
contradictorily intended to squelch a segregationist message.” Id. at 394.
424
See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379–80 (1992).
425
Black, 538 U.S. at 398–400 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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generated, accounts in part for the hard line on mask laws taken by
the Second Circuit in Kerik?
There are some reasons for thinking this might be the case. First,
the Second Circuit opinion in Kerik offered its own brief history of
the Klan—one that relied heavily on Virginia.
426
The Second Circuit
noted that “[m]ask wearing was part of the Klan’s activities from the
start”
427
and described the passage of the Ku Klux Klan acts and the
deployment of troops (including the Seventh Cavalry of Little Big
Horn fame)
428
to combat the Klan.
429
Turning to the Second Klan,
the court recounted the murder of Leo Frank by a lynch mob in 1915
and the political successes of the Klan in the 1920s, including in
Indiana where the governor and both senators were Klansmen.
430
On
the other hand, Kerik had less to say about more recent incarnations
of the Klan. The Second Circuit noted that the Klan “revived after
the SecondWorldWar” but remained splintered after 1949.
431
Aside
from the one reference quoted earlier in this paragraph, Kerik’s
Klan-footnote did not mention mask wearing at all.
432
Second, Kerik’s discussion of masks bears some affinities with
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Virginia.
433
Like the act of intimidatory
cross burning, which Thomas distinguished from “racist
expression,”
434
the Ku Klux Klan mask, so the Second Circuit
argued, had no expressive component apart from the robe and
426
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
200 n.2 (2d Cir. 2004).
427
Id.
428
The Seventh Cavalry played an important role in the Indian wars in the
American West during the second half of the nineteenth century. See PETER
COZZENS, THE EARTH IS WEEPING: THE EPIC STORY OF THE INDIAN WARS FOR
THE AMERICAN WEST 243–68, 446–58 (2016) (describing defeat of the Seventh
Cavalry at the 1876 Battle of Little Big Horn and its involvement in the 1890
massacre at Wounded Knee). The focus on the Seventh Cavalry’s role in
enforcing Reconstruction is an interesting choice for a court fixated on the use of
the 1845 mask law against anti-renter “Indians.”
429
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 200 n.2.
430
Id.
431
Id.
432
Id. at 200 n.2 (only mentioning mask wearing twice in a three-paragraph
long footnote about the Klan).
433
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
434
Id. at 394.
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hood.
435
But while Justice Thomas was able to support his
interpretation with a series of examples of Ku Klux Klan cross
burnings that intimidated victims,
436
the Kerik court contented itself
with a generic statement that the Klan wore masks.
437
Instead of
analyzing the Klan’s actual use of masks, the Second Circuit turned
to the Renters’ War for its historical account of threatening mask
wearing.
438
In the end, the Second Circuit had little choice. While cross
burning laws clearly demarcate Ku Klux Klan activity (even if all
cross burnings are not intended to intimidate), mask bans by their
very nature encompass a wide range of non-Klan members in their
grasp. The focus on the Renters’ War at least had the advantage of
putting the justification of New York’s mask ban on a broader
footing. At the same time, however, the doctrinal solution arrived at
in Kerik—that NAACP never protects masks and that a mask does
not carry an independent meaning beyond that of an accompanying
costume
439
—fits poorly for the many people who disguise their
identities for “innocent purposes” such as peaceful protest,
following the dictates of religion, dressing as another gender, or
entertaining neighborhood children.
440
In the process, mask law doctrine has travelled a long way from
its origins in Aryan, Ghafari and Robinson.
441
Where once First
Amendment doctrine about masks was hard to distinguish from
other forms of speech, by 2004 a large abyss had opened up. One
sees the extent of this gap in Snyder v. Phelps, where Westboro
Baptist Church founder and his family members picketed a military
serviceman’s funeral, displaying homophobic, anti-Catholic and
435
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 206.
436
For instance, Justice Thomas describes a woman terrified months later
after a cross was burned on her lawn. Black, 538 U.S. at 390 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
437
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 200 n.2.
438
Id. at 203–05.
439
Id. at 206.
440
See Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d 185, 189 (Ga. 1994) (dismissing guilty
verdict against a man who wore a mask to entertain neighborhood children).
441
SeeAryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Ghafari v.Mun.
Court for S.F. Judicial Dist., 150 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Robinson
v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1980).
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anti-military messages.
442
The Court upheld the Fourth’s Circuit
decision that the protesters’ speech was protected under the First
Amendment.
443
Acknowledging that the statements at issue in
Snyder have the potential to cause great pain,
444
Justice Roberts,
writing for eight members of the Court, explained that “we cannot
react to that pain by punishing the speaker.”
445
Once a speaker dons
a mask, however, the ability of a state to punish grows
immeasurably, even in many routine, harmless instances, and even
when there is no “pain” at all.
IV. MASKBANS FOR EVERYONE?
In 2004, one could perhaps be forgiven for wondering whether
the decision in Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
v. Kerik was significant. While there were some troubling factual
situations, like the mask-wearing entertainer of children in Daniels
v. State,
446
most cases have involved the Klan,
447
anarchists
448
or
people like the mascot opponent in State v. Berrill,
449
all of whom
might be viewed as dangerous or threatening in some way.
Moreover, outcomes like that inDaniels can be reached by applying
routine criminal law principles, such as by requiring a criminal
intent standard of intimidation
450
rather than by relying on First
Amendment claims of anonymous or symbolic speech. So even if
Kerik were wrongly decided,
451
the concern about state punishment
of innocent mask wearing would not seem pressing.
Today, nearly fifteen years later, things have changed. Section
IV.A discusses the growth of surveillance technology and how
modern circumstances are such that wearing a mask (or other
442
562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011).
443
Id.
444
Id. at 460–61.
445
Id. at 461.
446
448 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1994).
447
See, e.g., Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356
F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004); State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990).
448
People v. Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2001).
449
State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 510 (W. Va. 1996).
450
Daniels, 448 S.E.2d at 189.
451
See supra Section III.C.
134 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
disguise) has become a rational response to the conditions of the
digital age. It also discusses another noteworthy development of our
time: an increase in the use of mask bans in non-Klan contexts.
Taken together, these parallel developments suggest the need for a
vibrant First Amendment approach to mask wearing.
Unfortunately, the one major case decided since Kerik was not
encouraging for the protections of mask wearers. In 2018, the
Eleventh Circuit in Gates v. Khokhar granted qualified immunity to
a police officer to arrest a man for wearing a mask during a peaceful
demonstration.
452
The court in Gates chipped away at Georgia’s
mask doctrine when it concluded that State v. Miller had not, despite
all appearances, limited Georgia’s mask ban to situations where the
mask wearer intends to intimidate, or acts with reckless disregard of
intimidation.
453
In so concluding, Gates eroded one of the few
remaining protections of mask wearers: the intent standards of
“weak” mask laws.
454
It would be wrong to end this Article without
hope. And, indeed, there are grounds for hope. Dissenting in Gates,
Judge Kathleen A. Williams not only offered a persuasive counter
to the Gatesmajority,
455
but she also offered a pitch-perfect rebuttal
of the current trend of mask law doctrine by rejecting the embrace
of fear and symbolic politics that has characterized our national
conversation on mask bans over the past several decades.
A. Masks, Cameras and Antifa
As noted in the Introduction, mask bans predate the
smartphone.
456
When 200,000 people gathered in Washington D.C.
to hear Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I have a dream” speech in 1963,
they did not worry about smartphone cameras;
457
the same was true
452
Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018).
453
Id. at 1301–02.
454
See Swertfeger, supra note 58, at 188 (distinguishing between strong and
weak mask bans based on the presence of an intent requirement).
455
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1305 (Williams, J., dissenting).
456
See supra Section I.D.
457
For an overview of the 1963 March on Washington, see King
Encyclopedia, March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, STAN. U. (Aug. 28,
1963), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/march-washington-jobs-
and-freedom.
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of the million who marched in the same place in 1969 calling for a
“moratorium” against the War in Vietnam.
458
Today, things are
different. While some mask bans target only mask wearing (as
opposed to other protest activity),
459
all people risk having their lives
taped. Films will be seen not only by fellow marchers but, if the
taped subjects are unlucky, by millions of people. When this occurs,
the consequences can be devastating. People might be fired from
their jobs
460
or receive harassing messages on social media
461
—
precisely the kind of harassment the Supreme Court had in mind
when it held in NAACP v. Alabama that the First Amendment
prohibits compelled disclosure.
462
One might counter that technology brings transparency,
something mask wearing inhibits. Perhaps, for policy reasons, we
are better off knowing the identities of all hidden Communists, pro-
458
On October 15, 1969, 250,000 people marched on Washington D.C. to
call for a moratorium to the VietnamWar. See This Day in History – 1969Millions
March in US Vietnam Moratorium, BBC,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/15/newsid_2533000/25
33131.stm (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
459
In January 2019, a teenager from a Catholic School in Covington,
Kentucky was in Washington D.C. to protest Roe v. Wade. A video that appeared
to show him confronting a Native American went viral and led to death threats.
Nick Visser, New Video Complicates Uproar Over Incident Between Student and
Native American Man, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/native-american-make-america-great-
again-student_us_5c455270e4b0bfa693c4d1e1. After the 2017 protests in
Charlottesville, Virginia, right-wing participants were identified by photos and
targeted. See, e.g., Judkis, supra note 80; Richard Perez-Pena, University of
Missouri Fires Melissa Click, Who Tried to Block Journalist at Protest, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/university-of-
missouri-fires-melissa-click-who-tried-to-block-journalist-at-protest.html.
460
For instance, the tiki marcher was fired from his job at a hot dog stand, as
was the college professor. See Judkis, supra note 80; Perez-Pena, supra note 459.
461
This is why the safari sponsoring the couple caught kissing after killing a
lion had to disable its Facebook page. See O’Kane, supra note 81.
462
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958) (noting how
disclosure of “the identity of rank-and-file members exposed these members to
economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility”). Yet, as we have seen, Kerik distinguished
disclosing names from exposing faces. Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 209 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Lifers, Trump supporters and politically correct social justice
warriors in our lives. But not all people react to learning about the
politics of their barista, hairdresser, neighbor, colleague, school
teacher or cousin in the same way.
463
It is for this very reason that
advice columnists counsel readers not to discuss religion or politics
at social gatherings.
464
While some argue that masks stand in the
way of authenticity,
465
this discussion relates largely to metaphorical
masks (i.e., personas);
466
moreover, even at a metaphorical level,
masks allow the wearer to avoid feelings of shame that might
otherwise prevent them from being their authentic selves.
467
Another issue necessitating a stronger mask doctrine, however,
concerns the growth of technology and its increasing invasiveness.
It is one thing to worry that your picture at the “Save the Whales”
rally will appear on your friend, co-worker or employer’s Facebook
feed; it is quite another for your publicly-available images to be used
to draw conclusions about your character and your propensity to
commit criminal acts, as some proponents of facial recognition
463
At least this seems to be the case when it comes to Thanksgiving meals.
See Tom Jacobs, Political Polarization Shortened Thanksgiving Dinners, PAC.
STANDARD (May 31, 2018), https://psmag.com/news/bickering-on-thanksgiving-
is-fowl-play (describing how in 2017 family members with different political
preferences for president spent thirty to fifty minutes fewer together than the
average 4.3 hours spent during Thanksgiving dinner).
464
Ruth Umoh, These 8 Simple Phrases Can Help You Avoid Awkward
Political Conversations at Work, CNBC: MAKE IT (Nov. 7 2018, 11:47 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/07/8-phrases-that-help-you-avoid-awkward-
political-conversations-at-work.html.
465
See TinaWilliamson, The Five Masks WeWear andWhyWe Should Take
Them Off, HUFFPOST (July 13, 2016, 5:46 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/5-masks-we-wear-and-why-w_b_7786922.
466
For instance, among the five masks Williamson lists are the June Cleaver
positive persona and the Arnold Schwarzenegger “over-contrived strength”
persona. See id.
467
See John Steiner, Seeing and Being Seen: Narcissistic Pride and
Narcissistic Humiliation, 87 INT’L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 939, 939–42 (2006); see
also Rosie Leizrowice, Maskenfreiheit: The Freedom That Comes with Wearing
a Mask, ROSIE LEIZROWICE BLOG (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.rosieleizrowice.com/blog/masks (arguing that masks “surface parts
of the personality [one] might otherwise hide,” but also noting that mask wearing
can be “dehumanizing” and making the interesting connection between road rage
and the relative anonymity one has while driving a car).
THE LONG ROAD BACK TO SKOKIE 137
technology advocate.
468
In this atmosphere, it is hard to disagree
with Scott Skinner-Thompson that privacy-enhancing clothes, such
as hoodies and masks, are “a form of expressive resistance.”
469
Indeed, Skinner-Thompson makes the point that masks appear
threatening to the state precisely because they prevent it from
engaging in surveillance,
470
especially surveillance of African
Americans, who “are disproportionately subjected to surveillance
and structural oppression.”
471
While the concerns African
Americans had about being watched and followed were present long
before 2004 when Kerik was decided,
472
the growth of surveillance
technology makes these concerns much more pressing.
At the same time that mask wearing has become more
reasonable, mask bans have crossed into the mainstream. Once
primarily an anti-Klan measure, today’s mask bans are increasingly
used against people of color
473
and groups like Antifa, which have,
in effect, become the twenty-first century target of mask bans,
replacing the Klan. For example, in August 2017, Arizona state
representative Jay Lawrence announced on Facebook that he was
drafting a bill that would punish mask wearing during political
protests.
474
He came to this stance after a rally against a visit by
President Trump to Phoenix was met by masked protesters.
475
In
justifying his proposal, which eventually became law in a greatly
reduced form, Lawrence compared the protesters to the Ku Klux
468
See Chinoy, supra note 82 (describing how Chinese researchers in a
“much-contested” article from 2016 claimed to be able to distinguish “criminal”
portraits from “non-criminal ones”). While these efforts are full of “fallacies” and
hearken back to “Nazi ‘race science,’” id., this might make little difference to
someone branded a potential criminal.
469
Skinner-Thompson, supra note 85, at 1701.
470
Id.
471
Id. at 1700–01 (discussing the killing of Trayvon Martin who was
wearing a hoodie the day he was followed, shot and killed by George
Zimmerman).
472
In this regard, consider the lyrics of En Vogue’s 1992 song “Free Your
Mind”—“I can’t look without being watched, no / you rang my buy before I made
up mymind.” Free Your Mind Lyrics, GENIUS, https://genius.com/En-vogue-free-
your-mind-lyrics (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
473
See Skinner-Thompson, supra note 85, at 1701.
474
Giles, supra note 14.
475
Id.
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Klan, adding in a nod of reassurance: “Now, there are no hangings
of people, yet.”
476
To take another example, the language of H.R.
6045, the “Unmasking Antifa Act of 2018” which provides a fifteen-
year felony sentence for mask wearing, tracks the language of the
1870 Enforcement Act and its mask ban provision.
477
While there are mask bans that do not directly target other
activity,
478
the counter-Antifa mask bans raise a broader concern in
a society still not completely comfortable with the legacy of white
supremacy
479
which, as Justice Clarence Thomas noted acidly in
Virginia v. Black, involved more than the extreme violence and
intimidation of the Ku Klux Klan.
480
Antifa plays an important
symbolic role by establishing the Klan as a benchmark of racial
injustice, while at the same time relativizing the history of the Klan
by suggesting that there may be a force on the “Left” that is just as
bad. For instance, within the space of eight days, Texas Senator Ted
Cruz criticized the Republican governor of Tennessee for
celebrating Confederate leader and Ku Klux Klan founder Nathan
476
Id. (internal quotes omitted). The final version of the bill made mask
wearing an aggravating factor if a mask is worn during the commission of a crime.
See Dustin Gardiner, Proposal to Ban Masks at Protests Gutted, ARIZ. CENT.
(Mar. 8. 2018, 5:01 PM MT),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2018/03/08/lawmakers-
gut-arizona-bill-ban-masks-political-protests-jay-lawrence-bob-
worsley/407281002/.
477
Compare Unmasking Antifa Act of 2018, H.R. 6054 (2018), with 18
U.S.C. § 241 (2018).
478
For example, in 2017 after a series of protests over pipelines, North
Dakota passed a ban punishing mask wearing when done to intimidate or conceal
one’s identity during or after the commission of a criminal offense. N.D. CENT.
CODEANN. § 12.1-31-15 (West 2019); seeNick Smith, Bill Would Ban Protesters
from Using Face Masks, BISMARCK TRIB. (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/bill-would-ban-
protesters-from-using-face-masks/article_ca53a54e-3251-5c43-b213-
91ce02d269dd.html (linking mask ban to pipeline protests).
479
See Nick J. Sciullo, The Ghosts of White Supremacy: Trayvon Martin,
Michael Brown, and the Specters of Black Criminality, 117W.VA. L. REV. 1397–
99 (2015). See generally Erika K. Wilson, The Legal Foundations of White
Supremacy, 11 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 2–4 (2018) (describing how post-
racialism and colorblindness hide white supremacy).
480
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 393–94 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(describing the “litany” of segregationist measures adopted by Virginia).
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Bedford Forrest
481
and introduced a resolution declaring Antifa a
terrorist organization.
482
This argument serves two purposes. On the one hand, it leaves
President Trump and his red-cap-wearing supporters free to assert
that they are not violent actors
483
since they do not dress up in hoods
and masks.
484
At the same time, it creates an atmosphere wherein,
instead of enacting and applying mask bans based on intimidation
or violence, an entire organization is targeted. Part of the difficulty
is that the word “Antifa” describes a political view—anti-fascist—
rather than a specific group. As a result, a proposal to ban Antifa
from wearing masks, in addition to posing the same content
discrimination issues as would a law that specifically banned Klan
masks,
485
would face the definitional challenge of determining who
counts as an Antifa member. Here, Senator Cruz’s Resolution is
instructive.
486
While the Preamble mentions “Rose City Antifa,”
487
which was founded in the Portland, Oregon area and has been
operational since 2007,
488
the Resolution offers no definition of
Antifa. While there may be good reasons to worry about some of the
481
See Brett Kellman, Ted Cruz Denounces Nathan Bedford Forrest Day:
‘This is WRONG.’, TENNESSEAN (July 13, 2019),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2019/07/13/ted-cruz-denounces-nathan-
bedford-forrest-tennessee-governor-bill-lee-proclamation/1722704001/; see Ted
Cruz Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 20, 2019, 12:21 PM ET),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/26/us/ted-cruz-fast-facts/index.html.
482
Mary Papenfuss, As Far Right Violence Surges, Ted Cruz Seeks to Brand
Antifa a Terrorist Organization, HUFFPOST (July 21, 2019, 9:14 AM ET),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/antifa-right-wing-violence-ted-cruz-bill-
cassidy-resolution_n_5d33c982e4b0419fd32de46b.
483
In July 2019, this issue reemerged after President Trump tweeted that four
Democratic Congresswomen should go back to the countries they came from. See
Jordan Fabian, Trump: I Don’t Have a Racist Bone in My Body, THE HILL (July
16, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/453253-trump-i-dont-
have-a-racist-bone-in-my-body.
484
One wonders what the debate over mask wearing in the United States
would look like if the “Make America Great Again” message came in masks as
well as hats.
485
See State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 551 n.3 (Ga. 1990) (denying that the
Georgia law was intended to unmask the Klan).
486
S. Res. 279, 116th Cong. (2019–2020).
487
Id. at 2.
488
Id.
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tactics of masked protesters during conflicts between white
supremacists and anti-fascist protesters, the easier solution—and
one more consistent with the First Amendment—is to ban mask
wearing based on conduct (like intimidation and violence), rather
than to single out a specific group.
489
On the other hand, this type of
approach would give up the rhetorical point behind the Antifa laws
which is to show, without much evidence, that the violence
committed by Antifa is as bad, if not worse, than that committed by
Klan and its supporters.
490
When one combines the growth of social media and surveillance
technology with the explosion of anti-mask legislation, it is clear
that we no longer live in the pre-Kerik era, in which mask laws were
present and increasingly constitutional, but rarely used. How have
the courts responded to this new, more challenging era? As we shall
see, the answer to this question is, at first glance, not
overwhelmingly positive.
B. A Funeral for Mask Wearing? Gates v. Khokhar
In November 2014, immediately after the Ferguson, Missouri
grand jury refused to bring charges against Officer Darren Wilson
for the killing of Michael Brown, a large crowd gathered in
downtown Atlanta to protest.
491
Among the crowd was plaintiff
Austin Gates, who, when he arrived, “was given a ‘V for Vendetta’
mask by a [fellow] protester.”
492
At 9:15 PM, Officer Whitmire
called on the protesters to remove their masks; the request, which
489
Let me be clear, I am still quite skeptical about mask bans. That said, there
is a world of difference between a ban that narrowly focuses on violent behavior
and a ban that targets all mask wearing. As Sarah Armstrong of the Oregon ACLU
said of Portland’s proposed mask ban, “Behavior is the issue, not the mask.”
Elinson, supra note 12.
490
These claims are hard to make given the evidence. According to a report
by the Anti-Defamation League, while right-wing extremists “have murdered
hundreds of people in this country over the last ten years alone . . . . To date, there
have not been any Antifa-related murders.” Papenfuss, supra note 482 (quoting
the Anti-Defamation League).
491
Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018). Because the
defendants moved to dismiss, the court was obliged to treat the plaintiff’s
allegations as true. See id. at 1305 n.1 (Williams, J., dissenting).
492
Id. at 1295 (majority opinion).
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was repeated several times over loudspeakers, was not related to any
evidence of violence on the protesters’ part.
493
The plaintiff, who
did not hear the request, kept his mask on and, as a result, was
arrested by police in riot gear at 10:00 PM.
494
The arrest report
mentioned plaintiff’s V for Vendetta mask—and the plaintiff’s
failure to take it off despite repeated requests—but gave no
indication that the plaintiff behaved in a threatening way or that the
mask itself was threatening.
495
The plaintiff filed a Section 1983 claim objecting to his arrest
and the police conduct during it.
496
In response, the defendants
moved to dismiss based on qualified immunity, which requires that
the alleged violations of constitutional standards by defendants were
“beyond debate” and “clearly established” at the time of the
violation.
497
The qualified immunity standard is a difficult one for
plaintiffs to surmount,
498
especially in an arrest context where all the
officers need to establish is “arguable probable cause,” a fairly low
standard.
499
So, as with many mask law cases, the concern is less the
result reached by the court (in this instance, the Eleventh Circuit
granted the officers qualified immunity and dismissed the charges
against them)
500
than with the way the court reached that conclusion.
To begin with, the Eleventh Circuit, while relying on the
“arguable probable cause” standard, also said that officers had actual
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.
501
While recognizing that the
Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Miller and Daniels v. State
493
Id.
494
Id. at 1300.
495
Id. at 1309 (Williams, J., dissenting).
496
Plaintiff alleged that the police pulled him by his backpack, did not
explain why he was being arrested and shoved him into a police car. Id. at 1295.
497
Id. at 1295–96.
498
See generally Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against
Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773 (2016) (noting that qualified immunity
generally favors the government over private citizens).
499
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298, 1300. For instance, the officer need not be able
to prove each element of the crime, nor is it necessary for the officer to have
specific knowledge of the arrestee’s “subjective intent.” Id. at 1300.
500
Id. at 1305.
501
Id. at 1298.
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amended Georgia’s mask law to require an intent element,
502
the
Gates majority held that the intent standard was met because the
protest took place at night and the plaintiff failed to remove his
mask.
503
Quoting Miller’s recognition that a “nameless, faceless
figure strikes terror in the human heart,”
504
the court held that the
officers had the right to mistake the plaintiff’s failure to hear the
unmasking request as defiance and intimidation.
505
Here, the Gates
majority echoed Skinner-Thompson’s argument that, to the state,
concealing one’s identity is, by its very nature, intimidating.
506
By
construing the intent language from Miller and Daniels in such a
broad manner, Gates stripped mask wearers of one of their few
remaining protections.
Moreover, Gates made two additional arguments that further
limited the rights of mask wearers. First, the majority, while
conceding that the point was not “outcome-determinative,” took
issue with the plaintiff’s choice of mask.
507
According to an article
attached by the plaintiff to his complaint
508
and quoted by the Gates
majority, Guy Fawkes—the person whose face appeared on
defendant’s mask—was “[an] infamous insurgent who tried to blow
up the British Parliament in 1605.”
509
The majority added that the
mask’s other symbolic association with the graphic novel and film
V for Vendetta did not help the plaintiff, since the story “centers on
a vigilante’s efforts to destroy an authoritarian government in a
dystopian future United Kingdom.”
510
These negative connotations
502
Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d 185, 189 (Ga. 1994); State v. Miller, 398
S.E.2d 547, 553 (Ga. 1990).
503
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1301.
504
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 550.
505
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1301–02.
506
Skinner-Thompson, supra note 85, at 1701–02.
507
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1302.
508
Monica Nickelsburg, A Brief History of the Guy Fawkes Mask, THE
WEEK (July 3, 2013), https://theweek.com/articles/463151/brief-history-guy-
fawkes-mask; see Gates, 884 F.3d at 1302 (Williams, J., dissenting) (describing
how the article came to the court’s attention).
509
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1302 (quoting Nickelsburg, supra note 508).
510
Id. at 1302 n.4 (quoting Nickelsburg, supra note 508).
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carried by the mask allowed a reasonable officer to conclude that the
plaintiff “intended to threaten and intimidate the police.”
511
With this argument, Gates went further than Miller, which
discussed the anti-Klan motivations of the Georgia legislature in
enacting its mask law,
512
and even Kerik, which used the Renters’
War of the 1840s to justify insulating New York’s mask ban from
most free speech challenges.
513
The argument Gates relies on
attaches to the mask, not the mask law. One wonders just what sorts
of masks would not betray an intent “to threaten and intimidate the
police.”
514
What about a Frankenstein mask—he was a pretty bad
guy, wasn’t he? Or what about a Luke Skywalker mask—wouldn’t
this be representative of “a vigilante’s efforts to destroy an
authoritarian government in a dystopian future?”
515
Although the
“not outcome-determinative” language
516
offers some reassurance,
the approach Gates takes leaves a great deal of discretion in the
hands of the police.
Second, Gates dismissed a sentence in Miller in which the
Georgia Supreme Court, in defending the application of the mask
ban against charges of content discrimination, argued that “[i]t
would be absurd to interpret the statue to prevent non-threatening
political mask-wearing, or to condone threatening mask-wearing
conduct on a holiday.”
517
Instead of treating this language as shaping
what types of mask wearing are (or are not) intimidating,Gates held
that the “it would be absurd” passage from Miller did not establish
a rule of the type that would put the officers on notice.
518
Once again, the concern is less with the outcome—as the
majority notes, the “arguable probable cause” standard gives the
511
Id. at 1302.
512
State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550–51 (Ga. 1990).
513
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
203–05, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2004).
514
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1302.
515
Id. at 1302 n.4; see Luke Skywalker, STAR WARS,
https://www.starwars.com/databank/luke-skywalker (last visited Oct. 26, 2019)
(describing the character Luke Skywalker’s “battle with the Evil Empire”).
516
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1302.
517
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1303 n.5;Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 553.
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Gates, 884 F.3d at 1303 n.5.
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police a great deal of leeway
519
—as much as with the assumption
that Miller’s statement that Georgia’s mask ban allows for peaceful
masked protests is not part of the case’s holding.
520
At a time when
state and federal courts treat First Amendment speech and
association claims of mask wearers with skepticism,
521
the statutory
language of the mask bans themselves (as interpreted by state
courts)
522
constitutes the mask wearers’ last line of defense.
Chipping away at this language only exacerbates the challenges we
all face in an age of increased surveillance and mask bans.
C. A Return to Skokie? The Gates Dissent
So is there any hope at all? Hope may be naïve, or an illusion,
but in times of troubles it is also a necessity.
523
Fortunately, there
are hopeful signs of a renewed concern about mask bans. For
instance, ACLU chapters have been active in opposing and
restricting mask bans.
524
The efforts to ban Antifa ironically have
helped in this process to the extent they have led those who support
the goals of anti-racism to question the wisdom of using mask laws
and other speech restrictions, even against groups like the Klan.
525
519
Id. at 1298.
520
Id. at 1303 n.5.
521
See infra Part III.
522
See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1994) (using narrowed
language to set aside verdict of mask wearer); State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547,
674 (Ga. 1990) (adding narrowing language to the Georgia mask ban).
523
See Sciullo, supra note 479, at 1406 (arguing that “what legal scholars
must do is engage in [a] politics of hope, because hope sustains a critical
orientation to the world”).
524
See Elinson, supra note 12 (describing Sarah Armstrong’s objections to
Portland, Oregon’s mask ban).
525
I count myself as one of these people. Some of my change in opinion
comes from what I have just described. Another source has been my work over
the past two years with scholars such as Nikolay Koposov and Uladzislau
Belavusau who have written passionately about the dangers posed by memory
laws in Eastern Europe. See, e.g., NIKOLAY KOPOSOV,MEMORY LAW, MEMORY
WARS: THE POLITICS OF THE PAST IN EUROPE AND RUSSIA (2017); LAW AND
MEMORY: TOWARDS LEGALGOVERNANCE OFHISTORY (Uladzislau Belavusau &
Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias eds., 2017).
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At the same time, there is hope of a more practical sort,
stemming from Judge Kathleen Williams who offered a vigorous,
helpful dissent in Gates.
526
In this regard, it is worth remembering
that not all dissents are alike. While Presiding Justice Smith was
likely well intentioned when he appeared to react with glee that the
high school students he spoke with about Brandenburg v. Ohio and
Collin v. Smith understood that Nazis had the right to freedom of
speech,
527
his dissent probably did not achieve its desired end.While
the future is uncertain, the prospects for the dissent of Judge
Williams in Gates appear far more promising.
528
There are several reasons for this. First, the dissent is clear, well
organized and persuasive. Judge Williams repeatedly highlighted
the peaceful nature of the protest
529
and treated the language from
Miller about it being “absurd” to ban masks at peaceful protests
530
as an essential part of that court’s holding, one a reasonable police
officer would definitely know about.
531
She also pointed out that the
arresting officer did not explicitly describe the plaintiff’s behavior
or his mask as intimidating;
532
that protesting at night did not
necessarily impose a greater threat;
533
and that inferring intent from
the failure to obey a police order to remove one’s mask was not
intimidating because at the time the mask removal request was
made, the crowd was peaceful and obedient, which meant that the
officers had no reason to make the request in the first place.
534
In addition, Judge Williams did a great job rebutting the
majority’s efforts to rely on the history of Guy Fawkes to justify an
intent to intimidate.
535
To that end, she quoted from Miller with
regard to the history of the Klan, a history that included “numerous
526
Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1305 (11th Cir. 2018) (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
527
State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 545, 557 n.13 (Ga. 1990) (Smith, P.J.,
dissenting).
528
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1305 (Williams, J., dissenting).
529
Id.
530
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 553.
531
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1306 (Williams, J., dissenting).
532
Id. at 1307.
533
Id. at 1308.
534
Id. at 1309.
535
Id. at 1308 n.5.
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beatings and lynchings,”
536
before pointing out that “the admittedly
peaceful protest” at issue in Gates did not “bear any resemblance to
the Klan’s vast legacy of domestic terror, which the Miller court
discussed at length in its opinion and found to be clearly articulated
by the Klan mask, whether worn by one or many in daytime or at
night.”
537
With this language, Judge Williams began to roll back
Georgia’s mask law to its narrow anti-Klan origins while implicitly
critiquing those who sought to draw parallels between the Klan and
groups like Antifa.
538
But the most important—and hopefully lasting—contribution to
mask law doctrine offered by Judge Williams’s dissent is the way
she reincorporated masks into the First Amendment mainstream.
539
This was most evident when she discussed the question of
intimidation.
540
This issue is difficult for proponents of mask
wearers because, as Scott Skinner-Thompson points out, in an age
of surveillance, the very act of putting on a mask can seem
intrinsically intimidating to the state,
541
a position with which Kerik
(the most recent mask law case) seemed to agree.
542
Judge Williams
deftly maneuvered around these issues by comparing the
intimidating nature of wearing a mask at night to Edwards v. South
Carolina,
543
in which the Supreme Court upheld the right of a crowd
“engaging in ‘boisterous,’ ‘loud’ and ‘flamboyant’ conduct” to
demonstrate on the South Carolina statehouse grounds.
544
The doctrinal shift here is significant because it points to a way
out of the box in which mask wearers find themselves. Most of the
mask law cases uphold the mask bans, especially the more recent
536
Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 545, 550 (Ga. 1990)).
537
Id. at 1308 n.5 (citingMiller, 398 S.E.2d at 550–51).
538
See id. at 1308–09.
539
Id. at 1306–07, 1309.
540
Id. at 1307 n.4.
541
Skinner-Thompson, supra note 85, at 1701–02.
542
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
209 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting freedom of association claims because of security
concerns posed by masks).
543
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
544
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1307 n.4 (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 233–35 (1963)).
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ones such as Miller, Berrill and Kerik.
545
While no legal doctrine is
set in stone and most federal courts have yet to decide a mask case—
suggesting there is some hope for doctrinal movement in the
future—the cases that have been decided offer little for mask ban
opponents to go on.
546
By turning to the broader free speech
universe—in this instance through Edwards
547
—the Williams
dissent in Gates points the way toward reinvigorating mask law
doctrine,
548
especially when it comes to interpreting the mask laws
themselves.
V. CONCLUSION: RESTORING THE FIRSTAMENDMENT TOMASK
WEARING
While there are grounds for hope, the road back to Skokie will
be a long one. Over the past forty years, courts have moved steadily
toward allowing more restrictions on mask wearing. In part, this
reflects the nature of masks and mask laws in American history—
and the stories courts tell about them. In the case of New York, a
protest by rather sympathetic renters in the Hudson River Valley in
the 1840s gave rise to a mask ban that is now presented as a
necessary measure against murder and insurrection.
549
The situation
with the anti-Klan mask bans is even more challenging. While one
can theoretically distinguish the security rationale behind New
York’s mask ban,
550
the opinion in State v. Miller—and especially
the Miller dissent—shows how hard it is to oppose an anti-Klan
mask law without appearing to support the Klan.
551
545
See, e.g.,Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205–09; State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 671–
76 (Ga. 1990); State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 514–16 (W. Va. 1996).
546
See, e.g., Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205–09 (rejecting symbolic speech and
anonymity claims of mask wearers); Berrill, 478 S.E.2d at 514–16
(same); cf. Gates, 884 F.3d at 1300–02 (holding that a police officer had arguable
probable cause to arrest a mask wearer at a peaceful protest).
547
Edwards, 372 U.S. at 229.
548
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1306–09 (Williams, J., dissenting).
549
Kerik, 356 F.3d at 203–05.
550
See People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968)
(Markowitz, J., dissenting) (noting that nothing in the history of the Renters’ War
suggested that cross-dressing was a problem posed by masks).
551
See infra Section III.B.
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Nor have doctrinal developments been encouraging. In the space
of little more than a generation, mask law doctrine has gone from
cases like Aryan v. Mackey
552
and Robinson v. State,
553
which
upheld objections to mask bans in short, relatively uncomplicated
rulings, to the Second Circuit’s holding in Church of the American
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik which slammed the door on
symbolic speech and freedom of association claims of mask
wearers.
554
Worse still, in an age of increasing surveillance—and a
torrent of proposals to restrict mask wearing—the one recent case to
take up mask bans, Gates v. Khokhar, followed in the footsteps of
Kerik and indeed went further by suggesting that a police officer
could find intent to intimidate by examining the history of a figure
depicted on a mask.
555
Reading Kerik and Gates together can place
a mask wearer in a potential Catch-22.
556
If the mask has no
symbolic reference, a court is likely to find the mask “non-
expressive” under Kerik, thus gutting any symbolic speech claim the
wearer might have;
557
but should the poor wearer choose the wrong
historical or fictional character—Tarzan, Conan the Barbarian or
Julius Caesar (after all, he conquered Gaul)—the mask might be
judged intimidatory under Gates.
558
Perhaps we will be seeing a
surge of masked Easter Bunnies in the future.
Despite this, I am hopeful. In part, it is a hope reminiscent of
classical Marxism according to which each successive means of
production holds the seeds of its own destruction.
559
In a similar
way, the rise of surveillance technology and those willing to use it,
along with the explosion of mask laws, has created a situation in
552
462 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
553
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554
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
205–10 (2d Cir. 2004).
555
Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1302 (11th Cir. 2018).
556
Compare Gates, 884 F.3d at 1302 (some expressive masks can be
threatening), with Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205–08 (mask wearing is usually not
expressive).
557
Kerik, 356 F.3d. at 205–08.
558
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1302.
559
See Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to a Critique of Political
Economy, in ROBERT E. TUCKER, THE MARX-ENGELS READER 3, 3–7 (2d ed.
1977).
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which those once content—perhaps too willingly—to ignore the
doctrinal shift away from mask wearing as something only of
concern to the Klan and its supporters, now know better.
560
The
ACLU (and others) have been active in opposing the recent spate of
mask bans,
561
and JudgeWilliams, with her lucid, passionate dissent
in Gates,
562
points the way forward on the long road to reintegrating
mask wearers into the fabric of the First Amendment. For those
willing to reimagine a First Amendment that protects masks, there
is a world to be won.
560
One motive for writing this paper, and my larger project, which also
addresses laws restricting other ways people conceal their appearance—such as
bans in Europe on niqabs and burqas—is as a mea culpa for some of my earlier
work on the subject. While I still appreciate why restricting hate speech (and
masks) can be appealing in some situations, I am now more wary of how speech
restrictions can be used against the groups they intended to protect—something
they share with some restrictions of Islamic clothing.
561
See Elinson, supra note 12 (describing opposition of the Oregon ACLU
to Portland’s proposed mask ban).
562
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1305 (Williams, J., dissenting).
